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SOME REALISM ABOUT LEGAL SURREALISM
JEANNE L. SCHROEDER*
[O]ne must discard the prejudice that truth must be some-
thing tangible.'
I. INTRODUCTION: GRASPING AT STRAWS
Commercial law-the private law of personal property-is in
the grasp of a physical metaphor. The legal concept of possession
is conflated with the sensuous experience of grasping a physical
thing in one's fist. This metaphor is merely inept for the analy-
sis of noncustodial property interests in tangible chattels that, at
least theoretically, could be grasped. It is bizarre when applied
to intangibles. Rather than being simple and intuitive, as its
proponents claim, the metaphor of sensuous grasping can only
be maintained through the use of increasingly elaborate aux-
iliary metaphors and analogies. If legal realism was an attempt
to make commercial law more nearly reflect actual economic
practice, then the physical metaphor is legal surrealism.
This physical metaphor can be found in both an affirmative
and negative form. The defenders and critics of property alike
implicitly agree that the paradigm of property is the sensuous
grasp of physical things but disagree as to its implications. Does
it mean that nonsensuous property interests need to be
analogized to sensuous ones? Or, alternatively, does the absurdi-
ty of such analogies prove that property is a meaningless or
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
A.B., Williams College; J.D., Stanford Law School. I particularly wish to thank
David Gray Carlson, Paul M. Shupack, and Jack Williams for their insightful com-
ments and Joshua DeRienxis for his research assistance. An abbreviated version of
this Articles is intended to be published as part of JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FEMININE AND PROPERTY (forthcoming 1996).
1. G.W.F. Hegel, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 50 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969).
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obsolete concept?
In a series of recent articles, I have explored the persistence of
the physical metaphor in contemporary jurisprudence2 and in
doctrinal scholarship.3 In this Article, I further explore the per-
2. I critique a number of scholars who have attacked the coherence of property
in JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FEMININE AND PROPERTY (forthcoming 1996)
[hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix
Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 239 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The
Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 805 (1995) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces];
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property
as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder,
Virgin Territory].
3. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Liquid Property: The Myth that the U.C.C.
Disaggregated Property (Aug. 11, 1995) (work in progress, on file with author) [here-
inafter Schroeder, Liquid Property].
I have suggested that the physical metaphor persists despite its disutility, not
because of its utility, because it relates to the psychoanalytic tendency to try to
reduce the legal or Symbolic to the prelegal or Real through Imaginary identification
of legal conceptions with actual physical objects. In this and my other articles, I
refer to Jacques Lacan's concept of the psychoanalytic orders of the Symbolic, the
Imaginary, and the Real. See id. at 6-8; Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2, at
246-55; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2, at 884-93; Schroeder,
Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 155-65.
A complete explanation of these concepts is beyond the scope of this Article. For
the limited purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that the Symbolic includes
the social order of language and law. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces,
supra note 2, at 885; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 159. The Real
stands for that which is prelinguistic and cannot be reduced to or contained by
language. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2, at 885; Schroeder,
Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 156-57. It is, therefore, the order of limitation. It
is not equivalent to the actual physical world per se but includes our psychoana-
lytical sense of a world external to our consciousness. The Imaginary is the order of
images and includes our identification of the Symbolic and the Real with actual
objects. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2, at 885; Schroeder,
Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 157-58. For example, our identification of the order
of the Real with the physical world is an Imaginary identification.
In my articles and forthcoming book, I also suggest that the physical metaphor
for property is not the Imaginary identification of property with just any physical
object. I argue that, in Lacan's psychoanalytical theory, sexuality plays a parallel
role in the development of legal subjectivity as property does in Hegel's philosophical
theory. The physical metaphor is, therefore, specifically a phallic one-the imagery of
seeing, grasping, and wielding the male organ, or entering and/or protecting the
female body from violation. In other words, the ostensible ownership doctrine is not
merely a fallacy, but a phallusy. I do not rely primarily on this specific feminist
analysis of the physical metaphor in this Article.
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nicious use of the physical metaphor in commercial law, scholar-
ship, and doctrine, with particular emphasis on the law of per-
fection of noncustodial security interests and security interests
in intangible property. Specifically, I consider the rules govern-
ing the perfection of security interests under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and under the revisions to
Articles 8 and 9.4
In this Article, I will concentrate on the most extreme and
surrealistic example of the affirmative version of the physical
paradigm in commercial law-the doctrine of ostensible owner-
ship. This doctrine is frequently promoted as the justification for
the perfection requirements of Article 9.5 To the proponents of
this doctrine, property should not merely be grasped; it must be
wielded in the sense of being displayed for all to see.6 Not only
does the sensuous grasp of a physical thing raise a legal pre-
sumption that the grasper is the owner, but property interests
which do not, or cannot, take the form of physical grasp-
ing-such as when the object of the property interest is itself
intangible-are deemed to be so problematic as to be presump-
tively fraudulent unless "cured."7
In order to rethink property imagery, we must consider the
definition of property in terms of the functions it is supposed to
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL)
adopted sweeping revisions to Article 8 and related changes to Article 9 at its Au-
gust 1994 session. These proposals were proposed for adoption by the several state
legislators in early 1995. As of the publication of this Article, they have been adopt-
ed by at least 13 states and are being considered for adoption by a number of oth-
ers. The revisions are intended to reflect more adequately the indirect holding sys-
tem through which most publicly traded securities are held today. See infr-a notes
135, 142, 144-45 and accompanying text. Among other changes discussed in this
Article, the revisions will return the rules for the attachment and perfection of secu-
rity interests in investment property to Article 9 from Article 8. I discuss this new
statutory regime extensively in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This
Tinw? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 291 [hereinafter Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?].
In this Article, references to Articles 8 and 9 of the UCC shall be to the official
text as amended by the 1977 amendments. When the most recent amendments to
these articles are pertinent to the discussion, I will refer to such sections by their
1994 amended date.
5. See infira notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-56, 83, 117 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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serve and how it can be distinguished from contract. Elsewhere,
I have offered a justification for the UCC's treatment of property
within classical liberal political and jurisprudential theory that
emphasizes natural rights, personal autonomy, and negative
liberty.' In this Article, I offer an alternative justification for
the perfection requirement based on G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy
of right, which emphasizes the creation of personality,
intersubjectivity, and positive freedom. I will suggest that, de-
spite the fact that Hegel's theory of property is unfamiliar to
most American property law scholars and practitioners, it offers
an even more satisfactory account of property law than tradi-
tional Lockean theory.
In examining the law of perfection, I shall resurrect, and par-
tially rehabilitate, one of the chestnuts of precode law tradition-
ally vilified by modern commercial law scholars and supposedly
rejected by Article 9-the notorious case of Benedict v. Ratner.'
In Benedict, the Supreme Court held that a purported assign-
ment of accounts receivable where the assignor retained sole
and unfettered dominion of the accounts-i.e., the right to collect
or otherwise dispose of accounts without any obligation either to
account to the assignee or to substitute collateral-was fraudu-
lent as a matter of law and unenforceable against creditors of
the assignor." Although its specific holding and stated justifica-
tion are confused, the opinion reveals an intuitive appreciation
of property that the metaphor of sensuous grasp only reflects as
in a glass darkly. That is, in order for a relationship to be given
the legal status of "property," it must include the element that
Hegel called "possession" and which I call "objectification." This
is because, in contradistinction to simple contract claims, proper-
ty interests are generally enforceable against a class of
noncontracting third parties." The values of autonomy and in-
8. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 1.
9. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
10. Id. at 360.
11. Holifeld drew this distinction between in personam and in ren claims. WESLEY
N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
85 (W. Cook ed., 1919). I agree with this part of Ilohfeld's analysis. As I have ad-
dressed at length elsewhere, however, I disagree with Holfeld's contention that prop-
erty does not also require an object or res. See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE
458 [Vol. 37:455
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dividuation require that property claims subjectively asserted by
any individual legal subject must be "objectively" manifested as
a condition of enforceability against noncontracting third par-
ties. 2 This requirement is not merely formal but inherent in
the functional logic of a property regime.
Articles 8 and 9's perfection provisions can be explained as a
statutory objectification requirement for the property claim that
we call a security interest. 3 The legislature might decide, per
Article 9, that physical custody of tangible collateral is, in a spe-
cific fact situation, an adequate mode of objectifing a subjective
claim to a security interest. It does not follow, however, that
custody is the only possible mode of objectification, let alone the
most adequate or archetypical one, against which other perfec-
tion alternatives must be compared.'4 Specifically, in: this Arti-
cle I demonstrate that the mode of objectification adopted in
Benedict-dominion-presaged the new, favored mode of perfec-
tion proposed in revised Articles 8 and 9-control.
II. THE OSTENSIBLE OWNERSHIP FALLACY
A. Ostensible Ownership
1. Introduction
Commercial law scholarship and practice has traditionally
assumed that the archetypical form of ownership is immediate
physical contact with, and custody of, a visible and tangible
FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2, at 241; Schroeder,
Virgin Territoiy, supra note 2, at 60-61; Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at
2-6.
12. See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 205-14, 233-40 and accompanying text.
14. As one critic of the assumption that custody in fact adequately objectifies a
security interest has stated:
By providing generally for possession either to constitute the exclu-
sive or preferred means of perfection or to alternate with filing, Article 9
follows the premise that possession satisfies the function of perfection.
Subsequent parts of this article discuss why possession both fails to sat-
isfy the equitable basis for the preferential effects of perfection and im-
poses costs . . . .
David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article
9-Part I, 59 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979).
1996] 459
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object. I take the physical metaphor to its logical extreme and
call it "property as sensuous grasping." Ownership interests that
cannot be so reduced-either because the interest is
nonpossessory or because the object of the property interest is
itself intangible-are considered problems that need to be ex-
plained. In other words, this doctrine holds that reasonable
creditors presume that the possessor of property is ostensibly
the owner. Consequently, in order to prevent actual or con-
structive fraud on creditors, security interests need to be perfect-
ed.1' Possession, in the sense of physical custody or sensuous
grasp by the secured party, is the preferred mode of perfection
because it eliminates the ostensible ownership problems with
respect to the debtor's creditors." Article 9's alternate mode of
perfection by filing for many situations in which custody is im-
possible or impractical is permitted as a substitute, in the sense
of a form of fictive custody.' This notion of perfection is un-
15. As Professor Phillips has stated:
The presumption of a right to possession from the fact of possession,
moreover, largely underlies the doctrine of ostensible ownership, by which
one is presumed to own the property he possesses. Numerous decisions
and statutes, including the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, c. 5 (1571) and its
modern progeny, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, rest upon
that doctrine and the further assumption that creditors rely upon the
debtor's possession. The purchaser or creditor who allowed a false infer-
ence of ownership to arise by leaving property in the debtor's possession
could expect no leniency in resulting litigation.
Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
16. Professor Phillips also noted:
The secured party could best rebut the inference of the debtor's unfet-
tered ownership and assert her own right in the collateral by taking
possession of it. The original purpose of recording statutes was "rebuttal
of [the] fraud created by possession." Article 9, quite conservatively,
tracks this historical emphasis on possession and ostensible ownership.
Id. (quoting John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV.
617, 622 (1931)) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
'Mhe legal system's original method of providing this information was to give
primacy to possession. At common law, a debtor's possession of personal property
assured a prospective creditor that the debtor could give him an unencumbered
interest in that property. Possession was indeed nine points in the law." Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180 (1983) (footnote omitted).
17. The UCC takes the approach that "[a] secured creditor need not take posses-
sion of the collateral, but if he does not, he must make a public filing in a desig-
nated place before he can shift the risk of competing claims to other property claim-
460
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questioningly adopted by a large percentage of the academy and
the courts-a LEXIS search will produce literally dozens of arti-
cles and cases that parrot it as dogma.
This rule of perfection is typically justified on a combination
of ethical, economic, and empirical grounds." In the words of
Peter Goodrich, in "deciding which of two innocent parties
should bear the loss ... the courts have tended to resolve the
choice between innocent parties by distinguishing desirable and
less desirable forms of innocence." 9 This choice is made by
redefining innocent behavior as culpable. For example, our legal
system does not normally recognize a duty of any party in the
market to make affirmative disclosures to other parties, absent
a fiduciary, or fiduciary-like, duty to speak." Consequently, we
ants." Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 183.
As Professor Phillips so accurately argues in his critique of possession as a
mode of perfection, Article 9 still reflects the historical "preference accorded possesso-
ry security interests over filed security interests," Phillips, supra note 14, at 3, de-
spite the availability of filing as an alternate mode of perfection and despite the fact
that "business people have discounted the importance of possession, especially in its
role as a perfecting mechanism" as indicated by the fact that "[fliling, instead, domi-
nates as the means of perfecting security interests," id. Indeed, the filing require-
ments have a "structural affinity to possession reflected in the tie between the loca-
tion of filing and the place of possession." Id. Moreover, "possession by the debtor
generally governs the time by which . . . the secured party must so file." Id. (foot-
notes omitted). Phillips applauds the amendments made to Article 9 since its origi-
nal adoption. He believes these amendments have moved Article 9 further away
from what I have called the physical metaphor and argues that numerous consider-
ations "should continue to contribute to the decline of possession's importance." Id.
18. In his critique of ostensible ownership theory, Phillips presumes its traditional
ethical justification of preventing fraud. Phillips, supra note 14, at 4. In their de-
fense of ostensible ownership theory, Baird and Jackson recognize the traditional
ethical argument but seek to justify the rule in terms of efficiency. See Baird &
Jackson, supra note 16, at 179-90 (arguing that the assurance of a superior claim
rests in a party's ability to ascertain the risks imposed by both existing and future
creditors; the availabity of such knowledge benefits both the creditor and the debtor).
19. PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER
MINOR JURISPRUDENCES 144 (1996).
20. This rule is familiar to securities lawyers because it provides a stumbling
block in the development of a coherent theory of when insider trading constitutes
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). The law does not
prohibit all trading based on material, nonpublic information, only such trading
when the trader has a duty to disclose the information. Although our law generally
prohibits making affirmative misstatements, it does not usually make silence action-
able. In the case of securities fraud, the Supreme Court has consistently found that
there is no duty to speak absent a statutory requirement or a fiduciary or similar
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need to declare that the market's supposed presumption of
nonencumbrance imposes an ethical obligation on the secured
party who takes a nonpossessory security interest to give notice
to the market. The implied ethical obligation transforms the
actually innocent secured lender into a constructive scoundrel.
Not only does the earlier-in-time claimant lose his claim, we
now say that he deserves to lose because his action intentional-
ly or at least negligently deceived or misled the subsequent
purchaser. The purchaser not only wins, but we now say that
she deserves to win because she was deceived and reasonable
commercial expectations, those tickling skittish spirits, were
defeated.
The attractions of such an ethically based analysis are obvi-
ous. We feel good when virtue is rewarded and evil punished.
Unfortunately, the appeal to ethics and morality is, in fact, mere
justificatory rhetoric. It is too expensive to compare the actual
relative moral worth or culpability of actual rival claimants in
each case. We, therefore, create legal presumptions of good or
bad behavior on the parts of the rival claimants without making
any empirical investigation of actual market expectations and
practices. If "secret liens" are not actual frauds, they become
constructive frauds. Consequently, these rules that are ostensi-
bly ethically justified are, in fact, ethically bankrupt.
If the ethics of ostensible ownership theory are infirm, there is
an alternate efficiency rationale, which is, in turn, dependent on
a number of empirical assumptions.21 Economically, we pre-
type duty. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that a duty to speak does
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that no duty exists absent a relationship
of trust and confidence such as that of a corporate insider to shareholders of his
corporation).
21. Of course, like most law and economics proposals, this is an untested, and
probably untestable, empirical statement. For example, Baird and Jackson state:
Instead of either relying on metaphysical ideas about where "title" to
particular property rests or deferring to the contractual divisions of prop-
erty rights between two parties, judges and legislators should be sensitive
to the costs imposed on third parties by the separation of ownership and
possession whenever these costs exist.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 178. In other words, because their concern is
efficiency, they argue that we should adopt the commercial law rule, which would
lower costs as an empirical matter. At best, they offer assumptions that may or may
462 [Vol. 37:455
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sume it to be more efficient if creditors can be assured of know-
ing whether assets of a debtor have been encumbered.22 The
first to file or perfect priority rule is justified as being the effi-
cient rule that the parties would agree to ex anteY It is sup-
posed to be cheaper, in the aggregate, to charge a single secured
lender with notiying the market through relatively inexpensive
perfection formalities, such as physical possession and filing,
than to require the several lenders to engage in costly title
searches.24 An observation of the fact of physical custody is sup-
posed to be the simplest and cheapest search mechanism for
creditors, but requiring a secured party to take custody in all
cases imposes substantial costs on the debtor.'
Opponents of ostensible ownership theory have argued for
not have some intuitive appeal and, therefore, might or might not serve as a hy-
pothesis worthy of testing. Unfortunately, rather than suggesting an appropriate
empirical investigation of how creditors in fact make credit decisions and how to
estimate the relative costs of different regimes, they assume the very empirical data
on which their argument depends. As a consequence, they not only -fail to make the
argument they claim; they flout the very scientific method that law and economics
claims to respect. Consequently, ostensible ownership is not a doctrine or even a
theory; it is mere dogma to be accepted on faith.
22. Id. at 176-77, 182-90.
23. See id. (explaining the costs of placing the transaction risks on either the
earlier secured party or the later secured party and how Article 9's balance of plac-
ing some risk on both parties is more efficient); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143
(1979) (supporting Article 9's systematic treatment of priority rules as compared to
the ad hoc approach it replaced).
24. "We think that, as a general rule, the party wishing to take or retain a
nonpossessory property interest should bear the burden of curing the ostensible own-
ership problem, regardless of the type of relationship that party has with the party
in possession of the collateral." Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 189.
25. As Baird and Jackson state:
Because of the high costs of a rule that bans the separation of own-
ership and possession of property, one ought to examine the alternatives.
One alternative, of course, is simply to abandon all efforts to formulate a
rule for controlling the problem of ostensible ownership. First, one can
argue that the benefits of secured credit are not large and that a legal
regime that leaves some creditors less secure (and others more secure)
than the present one is therefore not particularly objectionable. Second,
one can argue that the costs of the ostensible ownership problem, even in
the absence of an applicable legal rule, are small: To the extent that
creditors need to know which property the debtor owns, private markets
will develop to provide the optimal amount of such information.
Id. at 182.
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years-persuasively, in my opinion-that there is strong empiri-
cal evidence that its basic underlying assumptions are obso-
lete." In our modem economy, property interests commonly, or
even typically, are not accompanied by physical custody of tangi-
ble objects. Consequently, the marketplace is fully aware that
physical custody standing by itself has no evidentiary value.27
In other words, creditors do not have to undertake expensive
investigation to learn that encumbrances exist; they can as-
sume, based on empirical data concerning debtors on the
whole, that they do.
Ostensible ownership doctrine, in this view, surrealistically
reverses cause and effect. Nevertheless, ostensible ownership
remains one of the primary explanatory theories of commercial
law. The theory probably persists because its critics have yet to
articulate a plausible alternate account of perfection require-
ments. As we shall see, in contradistinction, the sweeping revi-
sions of the sections of Articles 8 and 9 dealing with security
26. Many writers, including myself, question the empirical presuppositions of the
ostensible ownership argument. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 1.
Probably the most trenchant critic is Charles Mooney, Jr., The Myste:y and Myth of
"Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals To Extend Filing
Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988). Professor Phillips has stated:
Criticism of the doctrine of ostensible ownership finds its strongest
behavioral support in the actions of parties who extend secured or unse-
cured credit subsequent to the secured transaction. Even with respect to
creditors, one can poke holes in this criticism but its case seems incon-
trovertible-business people look to written, not possessory evidence of
ownership. And this view leads generally to recognizing filing, but not
possession, as a means of notice.
Phillips, supra note 14, at 35.
27. According to Professor Phillips:
The high cost and relative ineffectiveness of possession as a means of
allowing efficient use of the debtor's resources and providing certainty
explain why filing dominates as the perfecting mechanism. The ineffec-
tiveness of possession as a constructive notice is the foremost reason why
the law should recognize and encourage possession's demise. These factors
are related. Any attempt to make perfection through possession more
effective in providing the secured party with certainty conflicts with the
debtor's use of collateral. And efforts to make perfection through posses-
sion more effective in allowing collateral to be put to its most efficient
use inevitably increase the risk that third parties might mistakenly rely
upon the debtor's ostensible ownership and extend credit or purchase
assets unaware of the secured party's interest.
Phillips, supra note 14, at S.
464
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interests in investment securities, which have been recently
adopted by the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL),2 not only reject the specific doctrine of
ostensible ownership applied to securities intermediaries, but
supplant the more general physical metaphor on which it is
based.
2. Baird and Jackson
Probably the most vociferous and consistent proponents of the
physical metaphor in commercial law are Douglas Baird and
Thomas Jackson.29 Starting with their 1983 article, Possession
and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 93o and
continuing through Baird's recent article, Security Interests Re-
considered,3 they have taken the doctrine of ostensible owner-
ship to its logical extreme. 2 As described by Baird and Jack-
son: "Since Twyne's Case,... possession has been viewed as the
best available source of information concerning 'ownership' of
most types of personal property. Separation of ownership and
possession has been viewed as a source of mischief toward third
parties and, for that reason, as fraudulent."33 According to
Baird and Jackson, the same analysis should apply equally to
any other arrangement by which physical custody and property
rights are separated, such as bailments. 4 The issue of how os-
28. I examine these provisions in full in Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready
This Time?, supra note 4, at 291.
29. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATE-
RIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1987); Douglas G.
Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, S0 VA. L. REV. 2249 (1994); Baird & Jackson,
supra note 16, at 175.
30. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 175.
31. Baird, supra note 29, at 2249.
32. Their casebook on secured transactions is probably their most complete and
sustained paean to ostensible ownership theory. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 29, at 1.
33. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 180 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Mooney, who does not buy into such unvarnished ostensible ownership doctrine,
describes possession in the context of personal property leasing: "When a lessor puts
a lessee in possession of goods, the argument goes, the lessee's possession creates
the appearance of ownership by the lessee and may mislead third party creditors
and purchasers, including secured creditors." Mooney, supra note 26, at 725-26 (cita-
tion omitted).
34. As Baird and Jackson have stated:
1996] 465
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tensible ownership enthusiasts define possession is discussed
below in considerable detail.35 At this stage of the discussion, it
is sufficient to say that possession is supposed to mean immedi-
ate and visible physical custody as epitomized by sensuous
grasping of tangible things.
Baird and Jackson go far beyond merely arguing that osten-
sible ownership policy might underlie certain provisions of
Article 9 of the UCC.36 They view all noncustodial property
interests in personal property to be problems that must be
solved by a proxy for custody or avoided as fraudulent.37 They
argue that legal and economic policy, and consistency, demand
that ostensible ownership theory be extended beyond its tradi-
tional realm of secured transactions to all other noncustodial
property interests.38
Baird and Jackson's argument is both normative and descrip-
tive. The weak form of the normative argument supports a filing
regime for the perfection of hypothecations. The strong form"
would extend the filing system for other forms of noncustodial
property interests. Some aspects of the weak form of normative
argument are powerful. To paraphrase what I think is the pri-
mary point: if we decide that we want to encourage or even
permit secured lending,39 then it might make sense to provide a
One can argue that a bailor and a bailee, a lessor and a lessee, and a
buyer and a seller should be able to allocate ownership rights between
themselves as they please. But such an argument loses force when at
stake are the rights of a third party who asserts a competing claim to
the property.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 187.
35. See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
36. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 184-90.
37. "We think that, as a general rule, the party wishing to take or retain a
nonpossessory property interest should bear the burden of curing the ostensible own-
ership problem, regardless of the type of relationship that party has with the party
in possession of the collateral." Id. at 189.
38. "We have argued that lessors, other bailors, and secured parties should gen-
erally have an obligation to cure ostensible ownership problems as a condition of
making their property rights effective against third party claimants." Id. at 190.
Moreover, a debtor who has pledged collateral should have to perfect to protect its
interests against creditors of the secured party. Id. at 191.
39. "Uncontroverted benefits of secured credit are not easy to identify .... " Id.
at 182. Whether we should encourage security interests on efficiency grounds has
been the subject of vociferous debate over the last decade. See, e.g., David G.
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simple queuing system whereby lenders can establish, and rely
on, their relative priorities in collateral. As a society, we have
relied traditionally on the intuition that a general rule favoring
the first in line furthers our goals of fairness, simplicity, and low
costs (as well as our Lockean jurisprudential tradition that rec-
ognizes natural rights of property in the hands of the first pos-
sessor), although we occasionally recognize exceptions whereby
certain favored lenders can get "frontsies." °
In other words, we may want to set up a filing system to de-
termine the priorities of security interests for the same intuitive
pragmatic reason that Zabar's installs a "take-a-number" ma-
chine at the smoked salmon counter on Sunday mornings-it
reduces the number of fistfights among people waiting their turn
to obtain a scarce but desirable resource. In order to encourage
reliance and to keep investigation costs down, the line should be
relatively public and simple to join."' One can argue that this
roughly describes the Article 9 filing system that currently ap-
plies to many forms of collateral.
I start becoming suspicious that something is wrong when I
turn to the strong form normative argument. If third parties are
misled by secret noncustodial ownership interests, if a system in
which secret noncustodial interests are voided is desirable on
ethical, efficiency, or other grounds, and if we have a relatively
free market, then why has the market failed to respond by es-
tablishing practices or legal regimes that require perfection of
all noncustodial interests? Baird and Jackson raise this argu-
ment but dismiss it assertorily by assuming the very empirical
evidence on which their arguments depend." If legal realism is
Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994) (arguing
that security interests may be theoretically efficient).
40. An example is when we give purchase money security interests superpriority
over prior filed security interests. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4) (1977). Moreover, a-few re-
gimes reverse this schema and impose a last-in-time, first-in-right priority rule. Mar-
itime liens are an example of such an "ultimogeniture" regime. GRANT GILMORE &
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 742-51 (2d ed. 1975).
41. Some commentators, including Baird and Jackson, further suggest that the
default priority rule of first-to-file, first-in-right and the superpriority exception for
purchase money security interests may also be explained on economic efficiency
grounds. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 29, at 316-29, 336-42, 397-402.
42. According to Baird and Jackson:
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supposed to require the examination of actual commercial prac-
tice, then such presumption of facts without empirical investiga-
tion is legal surrealism.
In contradistinction, I believe that anecdotal evidence strongly
suggests that creditors are not particularly bothered by noncus-
todial interests generally, even though they seem to want a clear
priority system established with respect to secured credit specifi-
cally. As discussed below, even in the case of secured credit, the
drafters of the revisions to Articles 8 and 9, with respect to secu-
rity interests in investment securities, took the realist approach
of observing actual market practice and implicitly concluded that
lenders are not necessarily bothered by nonpossessory or
nonpublic security interests, let alone laboring under any pre-
sumption of nonencumbrance."3
3. The Historicity of the Ostensible Ownership Argument
The weakness of Baird and Jackson's normative argument
suggests fundamental problems in their descriptive argument.
Baird and Jackson present the history of personal property law
as evincing a concern for the separation of possession and own-
ership. They note:
With the exception of secured transactions and certain
other transactions [serving similar functions such as consign-
ments], courts and legislatures generally have respected con-
Second, one can argue that the costs of the ostensible ownership problem,
even in the absence of an applicable legal rule, are small: To the extent
that creditors need to know which property the debtor owns, private mar-
kets will develop to provide the optimal amount of such information.
... [P]rivate markets in information ultimately rely on a third
party monitoring the debtor to ensure that he does not misbehave. Al-
though this private monitoring may reduce some costs imposed by debtor
misbehavior, monitoring itself is costly .... We believe that legal rules
can be shaped to make relevant information publicly available at low
cost. The availability of reliable information about the debtor's property
reduces the debtor's incentive to misbehave by removing opportunities to
do so. For these reasons, an approach relying solely on private markets
seems less desirable than one that ensures priority status to a creditor
under defined conditions . ...
Baird & Jackson, supra. note 16, at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
43. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
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tractual divisions of rights in personal property... between
bailor and bailee, lessor and lessee, and buyer and seller,
even though third parties (principally potential creditors)
could not easily discover these divisions."4
Despite this admission, the thrust of their argument is that
judicial suspicion of noncustodial property interests is the histor-
ical norm, and "[that we tolerate the ostensible ownership prob-
lems created by these transactions is largely an accident of his-
tory." 5 To Baird and Jackson, the traditional protections of
leases, bailments, and other interests are economically irrational
aberrations to a general ostensible ownership doctrine. Indeed,
they emphasize repeatedly that, if we are to take the ostensible
ownership problem seriously, we should impose filing or other
notoriety requirements on other forms of noncustodial interests,
such as bailments.46
One can, however, view the history of the ostensible owner-
ship doctrine quite differently. For example, Charles Mooney
argues that our legal and economic system has never had a
general concern about the separation of ownership and posses-
sion per se.47 There has, however, been a concern for limiting
opportunities for fraud. "This fraud concern is separable from
the ostensible ownership concern that possession of personal
property begets misleading appearances of ownership upon
which creditors and purchasers may rely."" According to
Mooney, the landmark cases on which Baird and Jackson rely
invalidated the property interests of certain parties because the
facts in those situations seemed particularly amenable to being
used fraudulently.49 In this view, the traditional doctrine of os-
44. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 187 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 177-78.
46. Id. at 196-201.
47. Mooney, supra note 26, at 725-26.
48. Id. at 726.
49. Id. at 730-31. I do not wish to restate Mooney's insightful analysis, but a brief
discussion of one of the cases may give a flavor to the traditional case law. In Clow
v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819), the debtor, Hancock, purported to hy-
pothecate all of his property to two individuals, Clow and Sharp, before a court
awarded a judgment against Hancock in favor of a certain Poe. Id. at 276. Poe did
not learn of this hypothecation until he hired a sheriff to enforce his judgment
against the recalcitrant Hancock. Id. Clow and Sharp sued the sheriff for taking
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tensible ownership did not generally void property arrangements
that separated ownership and possession as fraudulent; it mere-
ly established a rebuttable presumption of fraud in the case of
hypothecations and a few other specific forms of the noncustodi-
al transfers.0 Moreover, most instances of separation of owner-
ship and possession have traditionally been found to be
unproblematic 1.5  Disputes among different claimants to various
forms of property are usually resolved by application of a combi-
nation of "derivation" (i.e., first in time, first in right) and "nego-
tiability" (i.e., bona fide purchaser) principles without reference
"their" property. Id.
We do not know much about the parties, but the skimpy facts reported in the
case are suspicious. The judgment of Poe against Hancock was for the accounting of
a defunct partnership between the two men. Although the court described this as an
"amicable suit," id., my experience is that even friendly breakups of partnerships,
like uncontested divorces, often result in bitterness. This outcome is especially true
when the parties disagree about the division of property. For example, my former
law firm has split twice in the last two years. Because I had resigned and with-
drawn my capital a few years ago, in order to teach, I was able to sit and watch
with morbid fascination the pitiful and disgusting sight of former friends descending
into mutual recriminations and, eventually, litigation.
Moreover, Clow and Sharp were not ordinary secured lenders of Hancock.
Rather, they had signed instruments as accommodation parties for Hancock. Id. The
hypothecation was to secure Hancock's reimbursement obligation in the event that
the accommodation parties were ever called under their suretyship obligation. People
do not act as sureties without a reason. Apparently Clow and Sharp were never
called to pay under the instruments. At the time the sheriff tried to execute upon
the property over six months after the hypothecation, the "collateral" was still being
used by Hancock. Id. Were Clow and Sharp close friends or intimate business associ-
ates of Hancock whom Hancock preferred over his former associate, Poe? Rather
than being a legitimate transaction that can be characterized as an abstract con-
structive fraud against hypothesized future creditors, this case reeks of being an
actual fraud-a sham transaction entered into for the sole purpose of defrauding
Poe.
50. Mooney, supra note 26, at 728-29. Mooney points out that Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925), the one famous case in which an irrebuttable presumption of
fraud was found, was not an ostensible ownership case. Mooney, supra note 26, at
733. The Supreme Court expressly noted that, as the assigned property was ac-
counts, possession was impossible. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 362. Mooney is technically
correct. As I discuss later, however, I agree with Baird and Jackson that the rule of
Benedict is closely linked conceptually to ostensible ownership doctrine, with domin-
ion over accounts serving as a metaphor for possession. See infra notes 70-99 and
accompanying text.
51. See Mooney, supra note 26, at 731 & n.183 (stating that, at common law, it
was possible to separate ownership from possession in the conditional sale context).
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to pejorative and conclusary allegations of implied fraud.
Mooney gives a convincing account of how the doctrine of
ostensible ownership developed and a policy argument as to why
the doctrine should not be extended beyond its original factual
context.5 2 I am suspicious of attempts to ground rules of com-
mercial law on the supposed presence or absence of fraud. As I
have suggested, if we are not willing to engage in case-by-case
determinations of the actual mental state of the parties in every
secured transaction, then we must draft rules of general applica-
bility. This requires the adoption of concepts of constructive
fraud, which rob the rules of the ethical purchase supposedly
implicit in the use of the word "fraud."
Nevertheless, I find Mooney's historical argument quite per-
suasive. My critique of Baird and Jackson's theory, however, is
not based primarily on historical interpretation. Although I do
argue that there are trends in the law that recognize that sensu-
ous grasping is not a completely adequate account of personal
property, I also agree with Baird and Jackson that the physical
metaphor of property as sensuous grasping has played, and
continues to play, a primary role in law and jurisprudence. 3
The dispute over which trend was more significant is, however,
not ultimately a concern with historical accuracy. It is, rather,
an element in an overriding disagreement over current practice
52. Id. at 725-43. Unfortunately for Mooney's argument, the language of the hold-
ings in the cases on which he relies is very broad and can be read to reflect a gen-
eral hostility to noncustodial property interests. For example, in Clow, Judge Gibson
declared: "What will it avail then, that a person intending to cover his property by
a sham sale, has it expressed in the contract, that he is to retain indefinite posses-
sion? Such a conveyance would bear the stamp of dishonesty on its front." Clow, 5
Serg. & Rawle at 278 (Gibson, J.). Judge Duncan agreed that "[ain absolute deed
without the possession, is, in point of law, fraudulent." Id. at 287 (Duncan, J.).
Similarly, in Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812), Judge Kent stated
that "[delivery of possession is so much of the essence of the sale of chattels, that
an agreement to permit the vendor to keep possession, is an extraordinary exception
to the usual course of dealing, and requires a satisfactory explanation." Id. at 339.
"Indeed, there is no case which sanctions such a sale as the one in the present
instance; for here no reason whatever appears for withholding delivery of possession,
and the sale must, therefore, be considered, in judgment of law, as fraudulent and
void against the creditor." Id. at 342.
53. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 180-81, 212. Indeed, this is one of the
primary theses of this and a number of my other articles. See Schroeder, Bundle-O-
Stix, supra note 2, at 239; Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 1.
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and future policy.
4. Custody As Evidence of Ownership
Baird and Jackson conclude:
Possession of personal property is the best evidence of its
ownership. The law of secured transactions has ordered
itself around this principle for nearly four hundred
years .... The drafters of the [Uniform Commercial] Code
did not go far enough either in abolishing metaphysical and
unobservable distinctions based on concepts such as "title"
or in adopting the more concrete concept of possession as
their benchmark.54
This is one of the clearest statements of property as sensuous
grasping of physical things in contemporary legal scholarship.
Legal relationships among people, which are not physically ob-
servable, are denounced by the realists' ultimate in-
sult-metaphysics! Their phrase echoes Karl Llewellyn's em-
brace of the physical metaphor in the Official Comment to UCC
section 2-101, which states that, under the law of sales:
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from
the contract and action taken under it without resorting to
the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as
being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making
practical issues between practical men turn upon the location
of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can
prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions
proof of words and actions of a tangible character."
Practical men need tangible things. In their article, Baird and
Jackson never use the word "title" without their intended pejora-
tive, "metaphysical." Presumably, by metaphysical they intend
connotations such as unreal, fictional, imperceptible, invisible,
54. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 212 (emphasis added).
55. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1977). I analyze how Llewellyn's critique of the common
law of sales influenced the structure of Article 2 in SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND
THE FASCES, supra note 2, and Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 12-44.
The comment is reminiscent of statements made elsewhere in Llewellyn's writings. If
not personally penned by him, it is a brilliant pastiche of his distinctive writing
style.
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intangible, inaudible, too abstract, excessively subtle, airy-fairy,
supernatural, ambiguous, uncertain, etc. Certainly it is not seri-
ous enough (or, dare I say, too feminine?) for real men who are
only happy when grasping their tangible things. In context,
however, they use it to mean the legal (or what I have called
"Symbolic") as opposed to that which physically exists.56 Other
metaphysical notions that they identify include leases, bail-
ments, and security interests.57 In other words, they have inad-
vertently limited the word "metaphysical" to a simple-minded,
folk-etymological meaning-that which is other than the physi-
cal-and imply that only the physical is actual.5" This limita-
tion precisely reflects our psychoanalytic urge, which I have
written about elsewhere, to achieve the goal of unmediated rela-
tionships by pretending to collapse the Symbolic (i.e., law) into
the Real (i.e., that which is external to law) by the Imaginary
conflation of the Real with the physical reality, as though prop-
erty could be reduced to our animalistic, natural, physical rela-
tions with the material world.59 This approach is bound to fail
precisely because property, like all legal relationships, is not a
physical relation of a subject to a physical thing but a Symbolic
relationship among legal subjects (albeit, in the case of property,
one that concerns their relative rights with respect to the pos-
session, enjoyment, and alienation of an external object).
Note, however, that Llewellyn's concern expressed in the Offi-
cial Comment is not the misleading nature of noncustodial inter-
ests but of nonobjective ones-that is, property interests that "no
man can prove by evidence."' Unfortunately, his physicalist
imagery already presupposes that objective means physical, and
intangible means subjective. This assumption is precisely the
56. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 190.
58. Etymologically, "metaphysics," of course, means after or beyond physics.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1418 (unabridged 1986) (defining
,meta" as after or beyond). This definition might seem to imply that it refers to that
which does not relate to the physical world and, therefore, is unreal. The origin of
the word, however, is much more mundane. It designates those subjects discussed in
that chapter of Aristotle that followed his chapter on physics. Id. at 1420.
59. I develop this argument thoroughly in Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2,
at 246-55.
60. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1977).
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error that Baird and Jackson make.
Like all proponents of the physical metaphor for property,
Baird and Jackson do, at some level, recognize its impracticabili-
ty, if not impossibility. They offer one of the usual solutions:
denial through the adoption of the physical metaphor and attri-
bution of the pejorative "metaphysical" to alternates. That is,
certain forms of nonphysical possession are implicitly analogized
as being equivalent to physical custody.
For example, Baird and Jackson do not defend the filing re-
gime on its own intrinsic utility. Rather, its utility is defended
specifically on the grounds that filing is just like sensuous con-
tact. "Both public recording files and possession share one cen-
tral feature: Information about competing property interests is
concrete and trustworthy. It is trustworthy because the informa-
tion is conveyed by events-making a filing or taking posses-
sion-that themselves determine legal rights."6' Baird and
Jackson assert this defense, despite the fact that they also recog-
nize that filing has distinct advantages over custody, in that it
allows the debtor to continue to use the collateral, thereby mak-
ing it more likely that the secured party will eventually be paid.
A secured creditor need not take possession of the collateral,
but if he does not, he must make a public filing in a designat-
ed place .... A filing system places fewer restrictions on the
use of collateral ... yet it still provides information that
allows a creditor to avoid the uncertainty caused by the pos-
sibility of debtor misbehavior.62
At one moment, Baird and Jackson do recognize that the
requirement of perfection must relate to some requirement that
property interests be objectively manifest as a condition of gen-
eral enforceability, but they do not understand this
requirement's full implications.63 "The doctrine of ostensible
61. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 184.
62. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
63. Baird and Jackson try to justify this on efficiency grounds based on unverifi-
able empirical presumptions as to creditor behavior and the relative costs of alter-
nate legal regimes. In contradistinction, I wish to avoid relying on that which we
cannot prove. I try, therefore, to derive this requirement from jurisprudential theory
of the ethical function of property. See infra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
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ownership assumes that such contractual divisions [i.e., of prop-
erty rights] are irrelevant insofar as third party rights are con-
cerned. What matters is that third parties be able to observe the
division easily and accurately." Unfortunately, after this cor-
rect starting place, their argument gets lost. Based on historical,
but unverified, empirical assumptions, they first assume that
physical custody is clear and informative and can serve as an
effective way of objectively evidencing a property interest. From
this they draw the non sequitur that noncustodial property in-
terests are not objectively evidenced, but a problem that must be
cured. This conclusion means that Baird and Jackson do not
fully recognize that the question of objectification arises in all
property claims. Because they conflate objectivity with
physicality, they believe that the need for objectification, what
they call the ostensible ownership problem, is created not by the
claim to property but by the separation of such claims and
physicality. Consequently, the test of an enforceable property
interest changes from whether it is sufficiently objectified to
whether it is sufficiently physicalized. "A party who wishes to
acquire or retain a nonpossessory interest in property that is
effective against others must, as a general matter, make it possi-
ble for others to discover that interest."5
Filing is therefore judged by whether it can serve as a substi-
tute for possession and thus becomes a form of fictive posses-
sion. Elsewhere, Baird and Jackson note in passing that posses-
sion may not be so unambiguous or even possible, but they mini-
mize this by assertorily denying the materiality of this problem.
Cases might also arise in which there is ambiguity about
which of two parties is in possession of property.
... First, although the question of whether a party is in
possession of property might be difficult in some cases, at
least when goods are involved the inquiry will be quite
straightforward.... Second, many problem cases do not have
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis ....
.. As we have seen, the doctrine of ostensible ownership
provides potential claimants with a method for obtaining this
64. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 190.
65. Id. at 178.
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knowledge: If a debtor is in possession of property, and there
is no filing, potential claimants can be confident they will
prevail over earlier claimants.'
Even if one buys (which I do not) Baird and Jackson's assertion
that physical custody of goods is unproblematic in most cases,
they are presupposing an economy in which most (or at least the
archetypical forms of) property interests involve tangibles. This
means that the law of perfection of security interests in intangi-
bles is developed by analogy to the presumed norm of tangibles.
If the law of tangibles is based on the presence or absence of
physical custody, the law of intangibles is developed by reference
to the presence or absence of something that, by definition, can-
not exist.67 This requires the development of ever more elabo-
rate fictions and metaphors.
As the drafters of revised Articles 8 and 9 have finally recog-
nized, historical presumptions as to the primacy of tangible
property and physical custody are obsolete in the securities
industry." Consequently, the rules applicable to investment
property should no longer be developed by analogy to the law of
goods or negotiable instruments. I would go further and suggest
that the noncustodial property interests will only grbw in impor-
tance in the future and that we should completely jettison any
and all legal presumptions in favor of physical custody.69
66. Id. at 193-94.
67. The common law dealt with this in two ways. First, it made it generally diffi-
cult to convey property interests in intangibles. The assignment of choses in action
was prohibited (although the numerous exceptions that grew up around this general
proposition perhaps made it a rule more honored in the breach). See 1 GRANT
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 7.1-.9 (1965). Second, it
"reified" certain intangible and noncustodial interests into pieces of paper called
negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and securities certificates, so that we
could fictively convey possession of the underlying property by handing over physical
possession of the paper. See 2 id. §§ 25.1-.3.
68. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
69. The assumed clarity and informational value of physical custody is addressed
below. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
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5. Benedict v. Ratner
The fact that Baird and Jackson include the famous case of
Benedict v. Ratner70 in the chapter of their casebook that covers
the history of the ostensible ownership principle is significant.
71
This inclusion, of course, follows from their custodi-
al/noncustodial distinction: if noncustodial interests are defined
as problematic, then property interests in intangibles must al-
ways raise the concerns that underlie ostensible ownership theo-
ry. In contrast, Mooney criticizes this approach because the
Supreme Court expressly denied that it was applying ostensible
ownership law.72 I argue that the Baird and Jackson approach
may be more plausible.
First, Mooney does not recognize that Baird and Jackson's
definition of "ostensible ownership" differs somewhat from the
common-law definition. They concentrate less on the presence of
custody in the debtor and more on the lack of custody in the
secured party. This approach may be implicit in the rule an-
nounced in Benedict. Second, despite his denials, Justice
Brandeis might be read as analogizing ownership of accounts to
70. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
71. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 29, at 51-58. Baird and Jackson do not state
expressly that ostensible ownership principles literally apply to security interests in
accounts. Their placement of the discussion suggests, however, that they see a
strong family resemblance.
Other authors have more expressly linked the rule of Benedict v. Ratner with
ostensible ownership principles. For example, one commentator has stated: "The
Twyne rule (and perhaps the Benedict rule) also may reflect the early common-law
dissatisfaction with the notion that possession and ownership can be separated."
John Dolan, The U.C.C.'s Consignment Rule Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 21, 34 n.84 (1983).
Another commentator has written:
Perhaps the United States's most noteworthy extension of Twyne's
case was articulated by the Supreme Court in Benedict v. Ratner.
... Reservation and dominion over the accounts by the debtor was
inconsistent with the assertion that title had been given to [the assign-
ee]. The debtor's grant of unrestricted dominion over the goods which
rendered ownership more than ostensible troubled the Court.
Darrell W. Dunham, Postpetition Transfers in Bankruptcy, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
41-42 (1984).
72. See Mooney, supra note 26, at 733-34. "But it is not true that the rule stated
above and invoked by the receiver is either based upon or delimited by the doctrine
of ostensible ownership." Benedict, 268 U.S. at 362-63.
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the sensuous grasp of goods and fixating on the lack of physical
custody, or its analog, in the secured party.
This reading of Benedict's rule exemplifies the tortured and
surrealistic logic of the physical metaphor. This pre-UCC case
invalidated an assignment of accounts receivable-what we
would today call a non-notification security interest in ac-
counts73 -on the grounds that, as structured, it was a fraud in
law. Prior to the adoption of the UCC, courts were particularly
hostile to noncustodial security interests and looked for every
opportunity to strike them down."4 As discussed above, one of
the weapons in the judicial arsenal was the doctrine of ostensible
ownership, which raised a presumption of fraud when possession
and ownership were separated in certain types of transactions.
The lawyers for the parties thought that they needed to ad-
dress ostensible ownership law. According to Benedict's syllabus,
both the petitioner and the respondent were concerned with the
impossibility of the literal application of its principles but, as
can be expected, drew opposite implications. Counsel for the
debtor's receiver, who wished to strike down the assignment,
first argued that the ostensible ownership rule was "not based
on any appearance growing out of possession but on the fraudu-
lent character of the arrangement." 5 Nevertheless:
Even were the rule predicated on a false appearance of
ownership, the facts here supply the equivalent, and more
than the equivalent, of any false appearance of ownership
arising from possession of tangibles. There was the actual
appearance of ownership deliberately preserved and sustained,
and deliberate concealment of the assignment to avoid the
obvious and contemplated consequences of disclosure of the
fact of the assignment of all receivables present and future."6
That is, there is an ostensible ownership problem because the
assignee did not take the receivables analog to physical custody.
73. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102 (1977) (defining "security interest" to in-
clude all assignments of accounts, including outright sales, in addition to assign-
ments for security).
74. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 67, §§ 7.3-.4.
75. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 354 (argument for Petitioner).
76. Id. at 355 (argument for Petitioner).
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Rather surprisingly, counsel for the assignee also argued that
possession (in the sense of custody) of after-acquired collateral
(in this case, accounts that arose after the date of the assign-
ment) by the assignee was necessary to prevail against other
creditors.77 Although it is in fact literally impossible to have
actual physical custody of accounts, the assignee argued that, in
this case, the assignee had an appropriate analog-i.e., he urged
that the Court expressly adopt the physical metaphor."
Such lien becomes perfected and ripens into a right at law
which is enforcible [sic] against third parties if, after the
property is acquired, the assignee take possession thereof
prior to an execution or attachment levy thereon, or the like,
by third parties, or the appointment of a receiver upon the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against the assignor.
The facts here constitute the equivalent, and more than
the equivalent, of taking possession of the accounts receiv-
able to the full extent that the nature of these choses in ac-
tion permitted.79
Alternately, the assignee argued that, if the court were to find
that traditional law required actual physical custody of collater-
al, "a condition which cannot in its nature apply to such intangi-
ble property as choses in action," it should recognize that, up
until that point, the rule had only been applied to mortgages
and that the court should not extend the rule to receivables
financing.0 A doctrine that requires physical custody is "greatly
out of joint with modern conceptions of industry and modes of
possession."'" In other words, the assignee argued that, if the
court were to find that custody was required, then the court
should find that the assignee had the equivalent of custody. If
the court, however, were to find that what the assignee had was
not equivalent to custody, then the court had to find that custo-
dy could not be required because to find otherwise would invali-
date all assignments of accounts.
77. Id. (argument for Respondent).
78. See id. at 355-56 (argument for Respondent).
79. Id. (argument for Respondent) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 357.
81. Id.
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The Supreme Court correctly noted the obvious-accounts are
intangible, so they cannot be sensuously grasped. Upon making
this discovery, the Supreme Court declared that it could not
literally apply ostensible ownership theory, which held that the
presence or absence of custody was the appropriate test for the
validity of an assignment.82
What does one do when one sees nothing that can be sensu-
ously grasped, as required by the physical metaphor? One com-
mon response is denial.83 In the Baird and Jackson reading of
Benedict, the Court metaphorically reinstated the ostensible
ownership rule, albeit under a new name. That is, the Court
erected some characteristic of an intangible that could then
serve as fictive tangibility that they could then pretend to grasp.
Perhaps more accurately, the Supreme Court, noting that
traditional fraudulent conveyance law was by its terms necessar-
ily limited to tangible collateral, turned to another closely relat-
ed aspect of fraudulent conveyance law to develop a more gener-
ally applicable rule of constructive fraud. This more general rule
announced in Benedict, rather than the traditional specific rule,
is that which Baird and Jackson have developed into their theo-
ry of ostensible ownership.
The Supreme Court claimed to rely on a rule of New York law
that had previously been applied only to chattels.84 "[A] trans-
fer of property as security which reserves to the transferor the
82. "It may be assumed, as [the assignee] contends, that the doctrine does not
apply to the assignment of accounts. In their transfer there is nothing which corre-
sponds to the delivery of possession of chattels." Id. at 362. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit had found that the assignment was valid because ostensible
ownership principles did not apply to assignments of accounts. See In re Hub Carpet
Co., 282 F. 12 (2d Cir. 1922), rev'd sub nom. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925).
83. I might rudely suggest that this relates to my broader feminist-Lacanian theo-
ry that the physical metaphor for property is, specifically, a phallic one. As Freud
noted long ago-and as many of my friends have anecdotally confirmed-when a
little boy first becomes aware of woman's terrifying lack of a penis, he typically
reacts with denial. He insists that what is lacking is really present, just very small.
Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theoty of Sex, Contribution II: Infantile
Sexuality, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 580, 595 (A.A. Bill ed. &
trans., 1938). Similarly, the Supreme Court, and Baird and Jackson, upon encoun-
tering intangible property's disturbing lack of physicality, reacted with denial, insist-
ing that a small analogy of physicality could be glimpsed.
84. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 359-63.
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right to dispose of the same, or to apply the proceeds thereof, for
his own uses is, as to creditors, fraudulent in law and void." 5
By analogy, the assignment in question, which allowed the debt-
or to continue to collect the account and did not require the
debtor either to apply the proceeds to the payment of the debt or
substitute new accounts for collective accounts, was also fraudu-
lent in law and void.8"
The Court distinguished this rule from the rule of ostensible
ownership on the grounds that "[ilt rests not upon seeming own-
ership because of possession retained, but upon a lack of owner-
ship because of dominion reserved.""7 Dominion was, therefore,
a replacement for possession as custody. But what did the Court
mean by dominion?
The Court described dominion in terms of powers of disposi-
tion rather than physical possession. Taken in context, however,
the Court clearly assumed that possession, in the sense of physi-
cal custody of chattels, was the norm. The Court described the
cases on which it relied as follows:
On the other hand, if the agreement is that the mortgagor
may sell and use the proceeds for his own benefit, the mort-
gage is of no effect although recorded. Seeming ownership
exists in both classes of cases because the mortgagor is per-
mitted to remain in possession of the stock in trade and to
sell it freely. But it is only where the unrestricted dominion
over the proceeds is reserved to the mortgagor that the mort-
gage is void.'
Why is it void? Because it is a fraud on creditors. The term
"fraud" implies that a real creditor or an objective reasonable
creditor observes the transaction and draw reasonable, but inac-
curate, presumptions on which they might rely to their detri-
ment. Consequently, the holding of the case was based not mere-
ly on the failure of the assignee to possess just anything, but on
the assignee's lack of something that could have been seen by
the creditors. Most interestingly, in this passage, the Court in-
85. Id. at 360.
86. See id. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 363.
88. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
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sisted, albeit in dictum, that they would have found the assign-
ment without dominion to have been insufficiently visible and
therefore fraudulent, even if it had been made discoverable
through recordation! Although the UCC rejected this result with
respect to assignments of accounts, to this day it remains the
rule for assignments of real estate rentals. 9
One can argue, therefore, that the Supreme Court implicitly
assumed that the sensuous grasping of physical things was the
norm of all property interests. Accordingly, they searched for a
characteristic of accounts that could serve as an analogy to sen-
suous grasping. Practical men cannot depend on metaphysical
somethings. Like the tribes of Israel in the desert, they feel
compelled to erect tangible things to worship in their place. The
Supreme Court decided that the validity of security interests in
accounts should be determined based on the presence or absence
of the creditor's dominion over them." The Court found that
dominion was necessary to prevent the fraud of deceiving other
creditors 91 -the traditional rationale of the ostensible owner-
ship theory. Dominion could serve as a form of sensuous grasp
by analogy. In effect, the Court seemed to assume implicitly that
by having dominion over an account, an assignee metaphorically
had sensuous possession. That is, the analysis was based not on
characteristics the interest had but on characteristics the inter-
est not only did not, but could not, literally have.
The above analysis, of course, is Baird and Jackson's version
of the ostensible ownership doctrine. The old ostensible owner-
ship cases concentrated on the presence of possession of the
property in question in the debtor/assignor. Baird and Jackson
(and implicitly the Court in Benedict) recognized that this is a
red herring. The real problem is the lack of possession in the
secured party/assignee
89. See David G. Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1075 (1995). This
rule is further discussed below. See infr-a notes 132, 135-48 and accompanying text.
90. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 363-64.
91. See id. at 362-65.
92. In Lacanian terms, a legal subject asserting rights must take on the sexuated
position of the masculine, but the ostensible ownership doctrine concludes that a
noncustodial party is in the position of the feminine. The Lacanian psychoanalytic
masculine position is that of having the object of desire (the phallus). The feminine
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In their discussion of the early accounts receivable statutes
that were adopted by several states partially in response to
Benedict, Baird and Jackson ask:
Does the ostensible ownership problem justify the filing here?
A debtor cannot appear to be in possession of something that
is intangible. But is this the relevant test? What is the pur-
pose of the filing rule? Is it to place a burden on secured
creditors to provide others with information that they could
only otherwise acquire with difficulty? Does filing in the case
of accounts receivable serve this purpose?93
In other words, Baird and Jackson argue that physical custody
is the best evidence of the existence of a property interest. Secu-
rity interests in intangibles are, therefore, problematic for pre-
cisely the same reason that hypothecations are problematic-the
secured party failed to put the world on notice by taking physi-
cal custody of the collateral. It is not relevant that the reason for
the failure differs in the two cases-physical custody being logi-
cally impossible in the former, and practically impossible in the
latter. By concentrating on the retention of custody by the debt-
or, therefore, traditional ostensible ownership doctrine is some-
what misleading.
Indeed, under the Baird and Jackson approach, there is noth-
ing wrong with a debtor's retention of custody of physical chat-
tel. The debtor, as well as the secured party, claims a property
interest in pledged collateral, which needs to be evidenced. Con-
sequently, Baird and Jackson argue that, although a pledge may
put the debtor's creditors on notice of the secured party's securi-
ty interest in the collateral, it creates a new ostensible owner-
position is that of being the phallus. Paradoxically, because the feminine does not
have the phallus, she symbolizes lack. These positions are sexuated because in the
Imaginary order we conflate the concept of the phallus (which is created by the
Symbolic and located in the Real) with real or physical analogs. The phallus is con-
fused with that which men have and women lack (the penis) and that which women
are (the female body). Consequently, we ascribe these abstract positions to the bio-
logical sexes. Similarly, ostensible ownership conflates the Symbolic or legal concept
of possession with the real analog of actual physical custody of tangible things. See
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, The Vestal and
the Fasces, supra note 2, at 873-917; Schroeder, Virgin Territoiy, supra note 2, at
153-70.
93. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 29, at 58.
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ship problem because it does not put the secured party's credi-
tors on notice of the debtor's equity interest.94
And so the Court in Benedict and Baird and Jackson are pri-
marily concerned with the secured party's lack. Where this lack
cannot be filled by custody, a substitute must be found or credi-
tors will be misled. In the absence of a statutory substitute, 95
the Supreme Court invented dominion.
The drafters of the UCC insisted that they rejected the rule of
Benedict with respect to accounts.96 By this they meant that
they did not adopt the Supreme Court's specific solution to the
secured party's lack. Article 9 makes it much easier for lenders
to offer what is known as non-notification accounts receivable fi-
nancing. Section 9-205 provides:
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against cred-
itors by reason of liberty in the debtor.., to collect or compro-
mise accounts... or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds,
or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the
94. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 307 (1984); Baird & Jackson, supra
note 16, at 191.
95. The Supreme Court's decision in Benedict might be read as implying that an
assignment that leaves the power of disposition in the assignor would be fraudulent
in law even if the parties comply with a relevant recording statute. The better read-
ing is that the Supreme Court was only interpreting the case and statutory law of
New York. That is, New York case law held that the relevant chattel mortgage
recording act solved only the traditional ostensible ownership problem (i.e., the con-
structive fraud caused the assignor's custody). This does not imply that the legisla-
ture could not pass a statute extending the effect of the statute to the constructive
fraud caused by failure of the secured party to take possession.
96. Official Comment 1 to § 9-205 states that this section "repeals the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner." U.C.C. § 9-205 cmt. 1 (1977). The comment continues:
The principal effect of the Benedict rule has been, not to discourage or
eliminate security transactions in inventory and accounts receivable-on
the contrary such transactions have vastly increased in volume-but
rather to force financing arrangements in this field toward a self-liquidat-
ing basis. Furthermore, several lower court cases drew implications from
Justice Brandeis' opinion in Benedict v. Ratner which required lenders
operating in this field to observe a number of needless and costly for-
malities: for example it was thought necessary for the debtor to make
daily remittances to the lender of all collections received, even though the
amount remitted is immediately returned to the debtor in order to keep
the loan at an agreed level.
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debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral."7
We need not, however, take the drafters' characterization of
their denial of Benedict at face value. On the contrary, the draft-
ers implicitly embraced Benedict's more general conceptual error
and insight. By error, I refer, of course, to the physical meta-
phor-the assumption that the secured party's lack of physical
custody of collateral is a problem that needs to be cured. This
assumption can be seen in the perfection rules of Article 9."
More interestingly, the holding of Benedict can be reinterpreted
not solely in terms of the formalities necessary to make property
interests enforceable (as Justice Brandeis did) but also in terms of
the substantive elements of property itself. Accordingly, not only
parts of Article 9 as currently in effect, but also its revisions, also
can be reinterpreted in light of this insight.99
B. The Case Against Ostensible Ownership Dogma
1. The Informational Value of Physical Custody
Baird and Jackson's argument as to the informational val-
ue00 of possession in the sense of physical custody or sensuous
grasp is conclusory. Indeed, the data they present actually sup-
port the opposite conclusion. Baird and Jackson note that the law
generally recognizes most noncustodial interests in personal prop-
erty.'0 ' Although this is an empirical question, I hazard to say
that these noncustodial interests are not only extremely common
but are becoming increasingly more common.' This is because
97. Id. § 9-205.
98. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
100. Their question of whether custody has informational value is roughly equiv-
alent to my question as to whether it adequately objectifies security interests.
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. Phillips made precisely this point in 1979. Karl Llewellyn thought that the
common law was stuck in the paradigm of an agricultural economy and sought to
update the law to reflect a mercantile paradigm. See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND
THE FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 12-13. Phil-
lips argues that Article 9 still only imperfectly adopts a mercantile paradigm. He
argues that the possessory alternative for perfection "calls to mind an agrarian or
early mercantile society in which trading, lending and other commercial transactions
might be thought to have occurred in a central town square within sight of all po-
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of an increase in the type of property interests that make physical
custody by all owners impracticable (such as lease financing) and
the proliferation of intangibles, which makes any such sensuous
contact a surrealistic absurdity.
As Mooney succinctly states:
Because filing generally is not required for leases under cur-
rent law, a lessee's possession of equipment does not make
ownership of the equipment ostensible at all. Simply stated,
possession of equipment by a user carries with it no suggestion
whatsoever, based on existing law, that the equipment is
owned, rather than leased, by the possessor. Moreover, the
prevalence of equipment leasing during recent years demon-
strates, as a factual matter, that possession by a user indicates
a reasonable possibility that equipment is leased, not owned,
by the user. °3
In other words, although it is probably impracticable to do a de-
finitive empirical study establishing the facts, Baird and
Jackson's assertion that physical custody is the best evidence of
ownership seems intuitively wrong. Regardless of what has been
historically assumed, contemporary property practices suggest
that, today, physical custody provides very, very little (if any)
information about ownership. As we have seen, counsel for the
assignee in Benedict v. Ratner argued that this was already the
case sixty years ago.0 4
Let us take as an example a relatively simple small busi-
ness-my old law firm.' Although in colloquial conversation I
tentially affected parties." Phillips, supra note 14, at 33-34. According to Llewellyn,
in an agricultural economy, the primary commercial activity is tile production and
purchase of goods for personal consumption. In a mercantile society, it is the trading
in wares for profit. Merchants take possession only temporarily, if at all, as a stage
in the sales process. See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 2;
Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 13. If the primacy of physicality re-
flects an agrarian consumption economy and imperfectly reflects a mercantile trad-
ing economy, it will become increasingly inapt as we enter a premodern information
economy.
103. Mooney, supra note 26, at 738-39 (footnote omitted).
104. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
105. Baird and Jackson do mention a similar issue but assertorily declare it atypical:
Cases might also arise in which there is ambiguity about which of
two parties is in possession of property. For example, one might have to
determine which property in a residential apartment is "possessed" by
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used to describe myself as a partner in the fiun, this was techni-
cally incorrect. We incorporated our business as a professional
corporation. Accordingly, when I was an associate, I was a mere
employee of the corporation. Although I spoke of having "made
partner," I was, in fact, elected as a director and given the right to
purchase shares in the corporation. When I was still in private
practice, the following goods were located in the suite of offices in
which my secretary and I worked: a few word processors, some
laser printers, some telephones, a photocopier, a laptop computer,
a portable printer, and various items of office furniture and sup-
plies. I personally owned the laptop and most of the furniture in
my office, but the portable printer and my file cabinets belonged
to two of my colleagues who had let me borrow them. Some of the
word processors, printers, and the secretarial furniture belonged
to the professional corporation of which I was a shareholder and
director. Some of the furniture and computers in the suite be-
longed to other attorneys who were employees and/or sharehold-
ers of the corporation. Some of the equipment was leased by my
corporation. Some were subject to purchase money security inter-
ests. I believe the telephone system was rented. My corporation
had once owned the photocopier, but we had sold it to another
company as part of a 'leased employee" arrangement. In other
words, the other company bought our copying equipment, hired
the individuals who previously were employed as my corporation's
service staff, and provided copying services for our corporation on
our premises. My corporation owned much of the supplies, but the
photocopy paper was owned by the service company, which sold it
to us as it was used. The corporation leased our main office in
the landlord and which by the tenants. Should either the landlord or the
tenant have to file to protect his interests? Should both? What about the
case in which a bank has a security interest in all the assets (including
the furniture and office equipment) of a company, and some of the furni-
ture in the corporate headquarters is in fact owned by employees? Should
these employees have to choose between filing to protect their interests
and bearing the risk that their company will become insolvent or default?
Should one ask if the bank relied on the furniture in making the loan?
As in other commercial law problems, one may have to balance the vir-
tues of clear rules against those of flexible standards as well as balance
competing equities of two innocent parties.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 193-94.
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New York but had an equity interest in the lessor. Similar own-
ership arrangements governed other property located throughout
the various offices my corporation owned or leased in other cities.
I can assure you that, when my law firm sought bank financ-
ing, it never occurred to the loan officers, who were familiar with
modern business practice, to presume anything concerning the
ownership of the various goods located in our offices, merely be-
cause of their physical location. Indeed, in the case of a corporate
debtor-like my law firm-the informational value of physical
possession becomes even more problematic. A corporation is an
artificial person with no physical body-it has no hands with
which to grasp sensuously. It can only hold things through its
servants. This raises the question: were the objects in "my" office
ostensibly owned by me as an individual or by the corporation
through me as its servant? Or by our landlord? Consequently, the
bank officers did what bankers normally do in making lending
decisions. They searched the public files; obtained copies of the
corporation's tax returns and audited financial statements; exam-
ined the contracts, leases, and security agreements in our files;
talked to the corporation's members, accountants, and perhaps its
major lessors and other creditors; and obtained representations,
warranties, and personal guarantees.
To put this another way, as David Morris Phillips argues, Baird
and Jackson must be wrong in asserting that physical custody is
the best evidence of ownership. °6 Custody can never convey un-
ambiguous information as to ownership precisely because people
do not take custody of goods solely or even primarily as a form of
communication; instead, they perceive possession as serving a
wide variety of practical purposes. °7 The meaning of custody is
always ambiguous. "Only an abstract means of perfecting security
interests avoids both the uncertainty as well as other inefficiency
costs associated with perfection through possession."'0° If avoid-
ing ambiguity is the goal, one should require a formal act that no
one would take for any reason other than for the purpose of con-
106. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
107. Perhaps the only instance of possession as a communicative act is the pledge.
Even then, the secured party often takes custody of the collateral not merely to put
the world on notice of its security interest but also as a way of policing the debtor.
108. Phillips, supra note 14, at 34.
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veying information. Consequently, even though, historically,
filing was developed as a "form of constructive possession,"'' 9 in
fact, it better serves the functions of perfection and should sup-
plant custody as the preferred norm. "Filing, with its attendant
specifics of what, where and how, generally avoids the recurrent
pitfalls that characterize perfection through possession and pro-
duce uncertainty."110 Indeed, at least in the case of aircraft and
equipment, Congress has, by making recordation the exclusive
mode of possession, implicitly determined that the mere fact of
custody is too ambiguous to serve as objectification."'
2. The Physical Metaphor As a Bad Infinity
Let us now examine in greater detail what Baird and Jackson
mean by "possession," which they claim is simple and unambigu-
ous. I have been helping them out so far by using the more precise
terms "physical custody" and "sensuous grasping.""2 I think
that Baird and Jackson are improperly expanding on crude no-
tions of ownership of consumer goods and negotiable instruments.
We will see that, with a few narrow exceptions, even in the case of
tangible chattels, their concept of possession as physical custody
or other sensuous contact disintegrates almost immediately into a
bad infinity. Before starting out, however, I do not wish to lay the
error solely at Baird and Jackson's door. As discussed above, they
are correct in identifying the simplistic concept of possession as
sensuous grasping or physical custody as that used in Articles 2
and 9 of the UCC."'
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Federal law makes recordation a condition of enforceability of all property
interests in aircraft and equipment, including ownership and leaseholds, in addition
to security interests. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 49 (1995); see Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David G. Carlson, Airplanes in Bankruptcy, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc.
203, 217, 254-59 (1994). The Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as
meaning that physical custody cannot serve as a perfecting formality for aircraft. See
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983) (holding that the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 prohibits all titles of transfer to aircraft from having validity unless
the transfer is evidenced by a written instrument recorded with the Federal Aviation
Administration).
112. Although, to my knowledge, Baird and Jackson never use these terms.
113. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
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One might argue that, despite the problems I will illustrate, as
a practical matter we share a cultural understanding of what
"possession" means in many, perhaps most, commonly recurring
situations. My reply is that, regardless of whether this is correct,
the legal conclusions that have been drawn from unexamined
presumptions of physical possession-such as Baird and
Jackson's suggestion that perfection formalities be extended to a
wide variety of bailments" 4-- do make a practical difference.
Moreover, any intuitions or cultural assumptions we may share
about possession relate to property rights in goods and, by exten-
sion, negotiable instruments, documents, and traditional owner-
ship of certificated securities (which are the reification of intan-
gible interests into physical pieces of paper). As our economic
organization becomes increasingly complex, and as intangible and
intellectual property take on an increasingly important role in our
economy, the conceptual problems with our assumptions about
possession can be expected to become increasingly significant.
The mismatch between our assumptions about physical custody
as incorporated in legal doctrine on the one hand and market
practice on the other, has already precipitated a crisis in the law
of investment securities." 5 Accordingly, the drafters of the re-
visions to Articles 8 and 9 have rejected the assumption of tradi-
tional law that owners normally take physical custody of their
property. Although revised Articles 8 and 9 permit ownership
through physical custody, they also recognize an alternate legal
regime reflecting current practice in which physical custody of
certificates resides with a central depositary and investors benefi-
cially own securities indirectly through a series of intermediaries.
Consequently, revised Articles 8 and 9 reexamine the role that
physical custody is presumed to play and asks what other devices
can serve this function. This is the policy behind the revised re-
gime in which priority among rival secured parties is determined
by the relative degree of power of alienation over the collateral.
The most powerful form of perfection-"control"-will, in most
114. See supra notes 34, 46 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text; see also Schroeder, Is Article 8
Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 303-38; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
111, at 234-38.
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cases, be created by contract with third parties rather than physi-
cal custody. 6
As I have stated repeatedly, Baird and Jackson and the UCC
implicitly limit the meaning of the word possession to physical
custody epitomized by sensuous grasping."7 The most obvious
mode of physical custody is what I have called sensuous grasp-
ing-holding a tangible thing in one's fist. This type of possession
takes literal form in the law of negotiable instruments and docu-
ments. In order to enforce a negotiable instrument, an owner
116. U.C.C. § 8-106 (1994); see infra notes 149-57, 205-14 and accompanying text.
117. This limitation is obvious in the rules of Article 9 concerning pledging as a
mode of attaching and perfecting security interests in certain forms of collateral,
U.C.C. § 9-304 (1977), and in the bona fide purchaser rules applicable to the en-
trustment of goods in § 2-403. I think it is fairly uncontroversial that the pledging
rules contemplate the transfer of actual physical custody of physical things from the
debtor to the secured party or to a bailee (who, of course, is defined as a person
who has rightful physical possession of the property of another). For example, § 2-
403(3) defines entrustment as "any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of
possession' of goods to or by another. Id. § 2-403(3). Once again, this definition
rather clearly implies that the drafters contemplated that physical custody be with
the entrustee.
Section 9-203(1)(a) requires as an element of attachment of a security interest
that there be a security agreement between the debtor and the secured party and
that the security agreement be evidenced either by possession by the secured party
or a writing signed by the debtor. Id. § 9-203(1)(a). Comment 5 to this section
provides:
The formal requisite of a writing stated in this section is not only a
condition to the enforceability of a security interest against third parties,
it is in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Unless the secured party is in
possession of the collateral, his security interest, absent a writing which
satisfies paragraph (1)(a), is not enforceable even against the debtor ....
Id. § 9-203(1)(a) cmt. 5. This language implies that the drafters agreed with Baird
and Jackson that physical custody of physical objects is relatively unambiguous, at
least in the sense that a signed writing containing minimal terms is deemed clear
enough to satisfy the policy of a statute of frauds, which would allow the parties to
get into court and testify as to the nature of their agreement. See Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David G. Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 577-80 (1990) (discussing how the draft-
ers of the 1978 amendments to Article 8 adopted the statute of frauds aspect of § 9-
203(1)(a) to investment securities by legal fiction). Moreover, the fact that physical
custody of physical things is included as an alternate (and, in the case of instru-
ments and money, exclusive) mode of perfection of security interests seems to indi-
cate that the drafters also thought that physical custody was notorious enough to
serve the same publicity function as filing. In Baird and Jackson's words, the UCC
seems to agree that physical custody is not merely some evidence of a property
interest, it is the "best evidence." See Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 212.
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must literally hold it and present it to the obligor. Holding is
defined as possession with any necessary indorsements. As any-
one who has ever deposited or cashed a check knows, this means
that the person seeking enforcement must literally hold the piece
of paper in her hand and present it by literally showing it and
tendering custody to the obligee. We think of the archetypical
consumer transaction as going to the grocery store, taking a car-
ton of milk out of the dairy case, handing dollar bills to the cash-
ier, and carrying the milk home. Llewellyn called his imagery of
sales as a physical event a "farmer's transaction."1 ' The clich6
of the minimum assets that even the poorest person owns is "the
shirt on his back"--something with which he is literally in sensu-
ous contact.
But, on second thought, this is inadequate even at this sim-
plistic level. The owner does not always have to hold the instru-
ment in her or his hand. Indeed, if the owner is an "it," and not an
individual, it does not even have a hand with which to grasp sen-
suously. The hand can belong not only to employees but agents
and bailees."' Under the 1977 Article 8, the hand that estab-
lished "bona fide purchaser" status (the Article 8 analog to "holder
in due course" status under Article 3) needed only to belong to
someone "designated" by the property claimant. 2° Despite the
wishful thinking expressed in Official Comment 2 to section 9-305
that "it is of course clear, however, that the debtor or a person
controlled by him cannot qualify as such an agent for the secured
party," 2' there is no such language in the statute itself, and the
question of when one can have vicarious physical custody through
agents remains unclear." The permissible identity of a person
designated for 1977 Article 8 purposes remains even more am-
118. Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 732
(1939).
119. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-305 (1977) (stating when a secured party can establish
possession through the physical custody of a third party).
120. Id. § 8-313(1)(a)-(b).
121. Id. § 9-305 cmt. 2.
122. Within the literal language of Article 8, the debtor could be designated to hold
the collateral for the secured party. Despite this, courts routinely read in common-
law limitations on permissible designees. I discuss this ambiguity in much greater
detail in Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 322-34;
Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 117.
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biguous; there are not even any "helpful hints" in the Official
Comments.
Physical custody of goods is perhaps even more confusing. I do
not carry most of my consumer goods around with me. I leave
most of them home in my apartment-that carton of milk is sit-
ting in my refrigerator. Yet I still believe that I own and possess
them. Possession, therefore, must mean more than mere immedi-
ate sensuous contact. Can I argue that I possess my clothes, jew-
elry, electronic equipment, and furniture because they are home
in my apartment, which I own?
No, that is no more adequate. Although I think of myself as
being a homeowner, I do not legally own my apartment because I
live in a New York residential co-op. I own shares in the corpo-
ration that owns the building in which I live and from which I
rent my apartment. Perhaps the better formulation is that I pos-
sess my clothes, jewelry, electronic equipment and furniture be-
cause they are home in my apartment which I possess (but don't
own). This argument, however, begs the question. What does it
mean for me to possess my apartment? Because an apartment is
too big for me to hold in my arms or on my back, one way I might
"hold" an apartment is by letting it hold me, i.e., occupying it."
Unfortunately, as I write this sentence, I am not there.
Perhaps, I could say that I occupy my apartment because, pur-
suant to the terms of my lease, I have exclusive physical access to
and control of my apartment in which I keep my clothes, jewelry,
electronic equipment, and furniture. Once again, this begs the
question. My husband also controls my apartment. He is a joint
tenant in my furniture, but I think I own my clothes and jewelry
separately. 24 Moreover, my cleaning lady has the keys to my
apartment. Indeed, when I wrote the first draft of this paragraph,
she was actually in my apartment and, as one of her jobs is to do
123. Psychoanalytically speaking, this situation is not merely analogous to, but the
same as, the metaphor whereby men say they possess a woman when they have
sexual intercourse-I possess my apartment by entering it. ERICH NEUMANN, THE
GREAT MOTHER 99-100 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1991).
124. I have some question about this because I pay my bills out of a jointly owned
checking account in which my husband and I commingle our salaries. I think, how-
ever, that my husband has made a gift to me of his joint interest in my clothes and
jewelry.
1996] 493
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the laundry, may actually have been grasping my clothing in her
hands that very moment. We frequently entertain houseguests
who temporarily have keys giving them access to my apartment,
use of the sleeper couch, as well as my towels, sheets, TV, VCR,
and stereo. I even allow them to consume my food, wine,
shampoo, and toothpaste and to charge their use of electricity to
my account.
Perhaps I could say that I have still retained some form of
exclusive access and control because my co-ownership with my
husband as tenancy in the entirety is a unique characteristic of
the law of marriage, which considers us one legal unit for some
purposes. In addition, we arguably retain our control because
voluntary contractual relationships with my cleaning lady and my
houseguests grant them merely limited access and control of my
apartment and my things. I am not sure, however, that this is
right either.
My landlord (i.e., the corporation of which I am a shareholder)
is the owner of my apartment. It has certain rights to enter my
apartment (through its agent, the management company that
manages the building for the corporate owner, which manager, in
turn, acts through the superintendent hired by my corporation)
under certain circumstances even against my immediate will. For
example, when I woke up this week, there was a notice under my
door reminding us that the super and another person would be
entering all apartments during the week in order to inspect the
terraces and screens. My landlord can even evict me permanently
in some cases, for example, if I do not pay my monthly mainte-
nance. The landlord has power to approve not only the identity of
any assignee or subtenant of my apartment but of the purchaser
of my shares. Is the landlord in possession of my apartment? Once
again, this might be explained by contract. By entering into a
lease and purchasing shares in a cooperative corporation and
thereby becoming subject to the contract terms of its by-laws, the
landlord has transferred the right of possession to me for a set
term." This right of possession, however, is subject to certain
limitations including the ones mentioned above.'26
125. In the case of a proprietary lease issued by a co-op, this right has a term
coterminus with my share ownership rather than a more conventional term of years.
126. Once again, Baird and Jackson raise a similar example but assertorily declare
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It should now start becoming obvious that my so-called pos-
session of my apartment is not physical at all. Rather, my pos-
session even of my consumer goods is a legal construct-what
Baird and Jackson would condemn as metaphysics. Except for
the clothes, shoes, and jewelry I am wearing this very minute,
and the chair and desk at which I am currently sitting, the
rest of my possessions are possessed not in the sense of physi-
cal custody or any immediate sensuous sense but in what I
identify as the Hegelian sense of legal acknowledgement by a
certain community that they are identified to me-in other
words, objectification. Moreover, although I am currently in
actual sensuous contact with a keyboard in an office at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, it is Yeshiva University,
its owner and my employer, and not I who is in possession of
the computer. 27
Ostensible ownership doctrine holds that we imply owner-
it trivial or atypical and easily handled by some unspecified exception to a more
general rule.
Cases might also arise in which there is ambiguity about which.of
two parties is in possession of property. For example, one might have to
determine which property in a residential apartment is "possessed" by
the landlord and which by the tenants. Should either the landlord or the
tenant have to file to protect his interests? Should both? . . .
These and other problem cases might be put forward as objections to
a general rule that makes a great deal turn on possession. We empha-
size, however, two points. First, although the question of whether a party
is in possession of property might be difficult in some cases, at least
when goods are involved the inquiry will be quite straightforward.
Whether a debtor is in "possession" of his drill press is generally going
to be a much easier question to resolve than whether he is its "owner."
Second, many problem cases do not have to be resolved on a case-by-case
basis as do inquiries into title.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 193-94.
127. This example points out how these problems become even more ludicrous and
complex when we turn to ownership and possession by businesses. I have already
referred to the very simple and typical case of my office in my law firm. See supra
text accompanying notes 105-06. Similarly, I am today sitting in my office (really
owned by my employer, Yeshiva University), typing on Yeshiva's computer but sit-
ting on my chair, behind my desk, on a Chinese carpet jointly owned with my hus-
band, staring at a painting owned by my husband severally, surrounded by my
books sitting on Yeshiva's shelves. Baird and Jackson raise, but dismiss, the em-
ployer-employee relationship as a trivial exception that easily can be dealt with by
a statutory exception to a general rule. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at
193-94.
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ship from the fact of possession. But even the most cursory
analysis shows that possession is not a sensually observable
fact. Rather, it is a legal conclusion that, in turn, can only be
defined, analyzed, and recognized by reference to the broader
legal concept of property. To put this in the Lacanian terminol-
ogy I have used in other articles, possession is Symbolic."
Baird and Jackson argue that, if we take the ostensible own-
ership problem seriously, then we should require that all non-
custodial property claimants cure the problem by some public
act-presumably filing, unless there is a good reason not to do
so. Because I am a tenant, there is no public record of my prop-
erty interest in my apartment.'29 At this very moment, as I
type the first draft of this paragraph, I am neither sensuously
touching the things in my apartment nor am I physically occu-
pying the apartment. Do I need to cure some ostensible owner-
ship problem by filing? In the past, there might have been a
good reason not to require cure in this case-impracticability.
With the advent of the so-called information superhighway,
however, it will soon be as easy for me to log my noncustodial
property interest onto the Internet every morning when I leave
my apartment as it is for me to lock my door. 3 ' Indeed, given
the impressive array of locks that we New Yorkers feel obliged
to put on our doors to protect our property interests from
thieves, the former will probably be less time-consuming than
the latter.
One might be tempted to argue that there is nothing to cure
because I constructively physically possess my things, as they
are physically located in the apartment that I legally possess. By
looking in my window, the world is on inquiry notice that some-
128. See supra note 3.
129. Obviously, the building's ownership is recorded in the name of the corporation.
The bank who holds the mortgage on my apartment has filed an Article 9 financing
statement publicizing its property right against my interest in the corporation and
the lease, but nowhere is my right against the corporation, let alone the world, of
public record.
130. Indeed, in a recent article, Baird has actually invoked modern bar code tech-
nology to raise the possibility of a universal title registry of all property interests in
equipment. Baird, supra note 29, at 2254-55, 2261-62. For a trenchant critique of
Baird's suggestion, see Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commen-
taly on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. REV. 2273 (1994).
496 [Vol. 37:455
REALISM ABOUT LEGAL SURREALISM
one is asserting the right to possess the apartment. Let us exam-
ine this assertion more thoroughly. The issue of ostensible own-
ership is not to establish that someone has a property right in
an object. In our capitalistic society, everything is owned by
someone unless it is expressly abandoned. Even then, the aban-
doned property escheats and belongs to the State. Rather, the
question posed by ostensible ownership, is who has a property
right-the person having immediate physical custody of the ob-
ject or someone else?
One might argue that I can "stake out" my apartment and
make my possession sensuously visible and obvious by leaving
my personal goods in the apartment. If some nosy parker were
to climb the tree in our courtyard and peer in my window, he
will not see just anyone's belongings-he will see my belongings
and be on inquiry notice that I claim possessory property rights
in the apartment. This argument, however, is a mise en abyme.
If my ownership in my personal goods is physically possessory
(and, therefore, does not cause an ostensible ownership problem)
because the goods are in the apartment I possess, I cannot point
to the presence of my goods in my apartment as evidence of my
possession of the apartment to cure the ostensible ownership
problem while I am at work.
3. Revised Article 8 and Ostensible Non-ownership
Baird and Jackson's claims about ostensible ownership and
deceived creditors thus seem highly unlikely as an empirical
matter. On the one hand, we have no reliable data that creditors
derive any presumptions from observations of physical custody.
On the other hand, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that,
contrary to Baird and Jackson's assertions, physical custody
provides little, if any, information about ownership. Possession
is a legal or Symbolic conclusion that cannot be simply equated
with any physical fact. Temporarily adopting, purely for the
sake of argument, Baird and Jackson's unsupported assertion
that creditors do rely, at least in part, on observations of physi-
cal custody of goods in making credit decisions, why would credi-
tors do so unless they had presumptions that custody conveyed
some information about the absence of rival secured parties? I
suggest that Baird and Jackson confuse cause and effect. Baird
1996]
498 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:455
and Jackson argue that the law requires secured parties to take
physical custody or make filing a condition of enforceability
against certain other creditors because creditors have certain
preconceptions as to possession. I would suggest that, if creditors
in fact presume that possession without filing implies freedom
from certain property interests, they do so only because the law
invalidates most unfiled, noncustodial security interests. 3' In
other words, if creditors rely, they do so because the law directs
them to do so. Once again, this empirical assertion is unverifi-
able, but I strongly suspect that if the practice or the law were
to change, any such presumption would quickly disappear.132
131. Because negotiation of negotiable instruments requires delivery of physical
possession, and because the sale of goods typically involves a change in physical pos-
session, pledges give secured parties considerable power to prevent a double dealing
debtor from selling or otherwise absconding with the collateral. As the secured credi-
tor found in the notorious case of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976), however, physical control over collateral does not in all
cases protect secured parties from buyers in the ordinary course of business. See
Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 49 & n.176.
132. A wonderfully confused case illustrates how ostensible ownership law analysis
complicates, rather than simplifies, the issues. In First Savings Bank of Virginia v.
Barclays .Bank, 618 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1992), a secured party tried to perfect a security
interest in a residential co-operative apartment. Id. at 135. In a typical co-op, apart-
ment "owners" do not in fact own their apartments but instead own shares of the
corporation that owns the building and are tenants of the corporation under long-
term proprietary leases. The co-op in First Savings was unusual because the co-oper-
ative entity did not issue physical shares to its members. Id. at 136. Consequently,
because the secured party could not take physical custody of shares, it tried to per-
fect its interest by taking custody of the proprietary lease. Id. at 135-36.
The court found that custody of the lease could not constitute perfection because
it was not the real thing in interest-i.e., the apartment. The court stated:
[P]erfection by possession is permitted only where it is widely recognized
that the underlying property which is of value, whether corporeal or in-
tangible, is conceptually entirely embodied in the written item in question,
so that the possession of the paper can be fairly deemed to be possession
of the actual property insofar as notice to third parties is concerned.
Id. at 138.
Creditors would be misled because the debtor was in possession (through occu-
pancy) of the apartment itself. The court consequently ruled that the secured party
must have physical occupancy of the apartment. Id. at 138-39. Next, however, the
court turned to real estate law and found that physical occupancy did not, in fact,
govern priorities in real property in that jurisdiction. Id. at 139. Rather, one looked
towards recorded title. Id. In other words, the court rejected physical custody of
documents as an indicia of title on the grounds that physical occupancy of the pre-
mises was required, even though it also found that, pursuant to local law, physical
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Consequently, evidence of creditor presumptions under the cur-
rent legal regime is no evidence of what creditor presumptions
would be in a state of nature and, therefore, cannot be used to
justify the continued existence of the regime with respect to
secured lending, let alone expansion of the regime to cover leas-
es and other noncustodial property interests. As Phillips suk-
gests, if people take custody of goods for a wide variety of prac-
tical (and, perhaps, impractical) purposes, the only conclusion
that one can reach from observing the fact of custody is that
the custodian probably wishes to further one of those many
purposes.133
I do not mean to suggest that there may not be other good
theoretical or practical reasons for us to adopt a legal regime
that would enforce only those property interests that we deem
occupancy of the premises was not a sufficient indicia of title.
The problem with this analysis is that it confuses a legal conclusion with a
finding of fact. The issue is not what third parties would presume by seeing the
debtor in occupancy of the property in a vacuum. The third parties' expectations are
formed by the rule of law. Indeed, the impact of recording acts is, as the court
eventually found, that third parties cannot rely exclusively on the occupancy of real
estate (although sometimes this can put real estate claimants on inquiry notice to
investigate the state of title). The issue, consequently, is what is the legal regime in
the District of Columbia for establishing title in apartments?
The court need only have turned to the local law for establishing title in real
estate. Article 9 does not govern real estate leases, so the possessory rules of Article
9 are irrelevant. If the local real estate law requires real estate interests to be re-
corded, this is the end of the question without reference to ostensible ownership
theory.
The perfection of security interests in real estate co-ops was a major issue in
my home state of New York because this is the primary mode of residential owner-
ship in the City of New York. The shares issued by a co-operative would seem to be
Article 8 securities under the official version of 1977 Article 8, which can be perfect-
ed by possession. Nevertheless, the accompanying proprietary lease would seem to be
a real estate interest that would have to be recorded. Consequently, secured parties
used the "belt and suspenders" approach and both took possession and filed. New
York simplified this through nonuniform amendments to Articles 8 and 9. Security
interests in co-operative real estate are now governed by Article 9 and are perfected
by filing in the appropriate office. N.Y. [U.C.C.] §§ 9-104(j), 9-304(1), (7), 9-401(1)(b),
9-403(8) (Consol. Supp. 1994). As a result, possession of the stock certificates and
real estate registration are no longer required. Nevertheless, in order to police their
debtors and discourage second security interests, co-op financiers typically do take
possession of the stock certificates. (Indeed, one might ask, how could a bank physi-
cally occupy an apartment? By opening up a branch office in the bedroom?)
133. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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objective, in the sense of public, intersubjective, and determina-
ble by affected third parties without the further cooperation of
the property claimants. For example, I have already discussed
that the secured lending industry might want some relatively
simple, inexpensive, and reliable queuing system to establish
priority." Even if one agrees that we want some legal regime
requiring the objectification of certain property interests, howev-
er, it is absurd to posit-as the ostensible ownership theory
does-reliance on any specific, preexisting regime as justification
for the continuance of such a regime.
In contradistinction, the revisions of Articles 8 and 9 of the
UCC governing security interests in securities, approved by
the NCCUSL in 1994, were based not on the suppositions by
academics about what presumptions hypothetical creditors
should make but on an examination of the actual practices
that have developed in the securities investment industry in
the absence of an adequate statutory regime.'35 The drafters
thereby followed in the footsteps of the legal realists who origi-
nally drafted the UCC rather than those of the legal surrealists
who have tried to interpret it. The revisions reflect a judgment by
the drafting committee that the doctrine of ostensible ownership is
no longer correct as an empirical matter in this industry. They go
so far as to adopt what might be called a doctrine of ostensible non-
ownership.'36
This is particularly remarkable because the physical metaphor
had long been incorporated into the law of investment securi-
ties."' In the nineteenth century, states adopted statutes
134. For example, in another article, I argue that the traditional liberal jurispru-
dential policy of furthering personal autonomy argues for requiring property claims
in the law of sales to be objectively verifiable as a condition of enforceability against
third parties. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 15-19. In this Article,
I shall expand this analysis to security interests and further develop a Hegelian
jurisprudential justification for objectification of property.
135. See Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 351-59.
136. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
137. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTI-
CLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES (WrrH AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS) 1 (1994) [hereinafter REVISED ARTICLES 8 AND 9] (stating that Article 8 was
originally "based on the assumption that possession and delivery of physical certifi-
cates are the key elements in the securities holding system").
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reifying securities into negotiable security certificates because
the common law was uncomfortable with the concept of assign-
ment of intangible property interests.3 ' This meant that, simi-
lar to negotiable instruments and documents, transfers of owner-
ship of 'ecurities could then be accomplished through the deliv-
ery of the physical certificate evidencing the security (with any
appropriate indorsements)."9 Consequently, the only permis-
sible mode of perfecting a security interest in a security was
through sensuous grasp-pledging. Under Article 8 as amended
in 1977, security interests in certificated securities in the custo-
dy of other persons are analyzed in terms of vicarious possession
through common-law principles of agency and bailment. 4 ° For
the sake of parallelism, even the rules for security interests in
uncertificated securities-which cannot be sensuously
grasped-were based on fictive vicarious possession through
agents and bailees.'
This approach may have adequately described securities in-
vestment practices of the mid-twentieth century. Today, howev-
er, most investors no longer take physical custody of certificates
representing securities. Rather, securities are held in a complex
pyramidal system with a depositary who has actual custody of
the certificates at the top, the ultimate investors at the bottom,
and tiers of broker-dealers and other institutions in between. 4
The several property interests of the various parties are evi-
denced by book entries on the books of other parties. Upper-tier
parties only have knowledge of the identities of their immediate
lower-tier customers and account holders. Lower-tier parties
138. Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities: State and Federal Interaction, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 443-46 (1990).
139. See Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 305-06.
140. See id. at 328-31.
141. Id. at 312-22.
142. It is estimated that the certificates representing 60% to 80% of all publicly
traded securities are held by one central clearing corporation, the Depository Trust
Company. REVISED ARTICLES 8 AND 9, supra note 137, at 2. Moreover, under appli-
cable federal regulations, all federal debt securities are issued in uncertificated form,
and only members of the federal reserve system can be registered owners. Conse-
quently, by definition, nonbank investors in treasury bills and other federal debt
cannot take custody of their investments but must hold them indirectly through
financial intermediaries. 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.117(a)(2)-(3) (1995); REVISED ARTICLES 8
AND 9, supra note 137, at 12-13.
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only have direct knowledge of their immediate upper-tier finan-
cial intermediary. Upper-tier parties are not merely custodians
of the securities "held" for their lower-tier customers but are also
frequently their secured lenders holding security interests in
such securities. Moreover, upper-tier parties may also, in turn,
rehypothecate such custodial securities to parties further up the
pyramid, as well as to other financial institutions. The simple
physical metaphor and analogies to agency and bailment princi-
ples have become increasingly unrealistic as a theoretical mat-
ter, and unworkable as a practical matter, as a means of sorting
out the interrelationships among these different parties."'
One thing seems clear, however. In such a complex system,
neither actual custody of the certificates evidencing investment
property by a depositary, broker-dealer, or other financial insti-
tution nor lack of custody by an institution or investor, can give
the slightest clue as to the nature of the relative property inter-
ests claimed by the various parties in this system. The usual
Article 9 solution when physical custody is impracticable-notice
filing-is also unworkable in practice. Because of the unusual
practices of the securities industry, if filing were required, every
broker would have dozens of financing statements filed against
it each saying only that "financial assets" were covered. Not only
would such filing provide no additional information to the lend-
ing community, which already presumes that securities held by
a broker are already encumbered, but it would be useless for
establishing priorities.1"
The 1994 revisions, in effect, reverse the structure of Article 9
with respect to investment securities in order to make it more
accurately reflect actual industry practices. Article 9 starts with
an implicit assumption that property is normally owned by one
claimant free and clear of property claims of others. Consequent-
ly, secured parties must put the world on notice that they are
changing the status quo by taking appropriate perfection formal-
ities. In contradistinction, securities "held" by broker-dealers are
usually subject to multiple competing property claims of custom-
ers, clearing agents, secured lenders, and others. Consequently,
143. See Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 328-31.
144. Id. at 397-99.
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the revisions, in effect, give notice of this practice to the world
(i.e., the professional lending industry) and inform it that it is
not legally entitled to make any presumption as to ostensible
unfettered ownership of investment property from the fact of
physical or constructive custody by any securities professional.
From now on, creditors are legally required to assume the oppo-
site--ostensible non-ownership.
Accordingly, revised Articles 8 and 9 provide for the automatic
perfection of security interests in securities and other invest-
ment property granted by broker-dealers and certain other secu-
rities intermediaries." 5 Moreover, recognizing that, under such
a system, there will be no simple objective way of establishing
the order of creation of security interests, all secured parties
relying on automatic perfection will have the same priority and
share the collateral pro rata.'46
By rethinking the concept of possession and perfection, the
drafters of revised Articles 8 and 9 were also able to give credi-
tors a means to opt out of this pro rata sharing regime.'47 The
problem with the existing regime is that the two traditional
methods of perfection--custody and filing-as well as the new
method of automatic perfection, give little meaningful informa-
tion to the public about the specific property interest of any
individual claimant. This is why all claimants who so perfect
will share equally. This logic suggests, however, that a secured
party who gives meaningful notice of its specific interest to other
claimants should be entitled to individualistic treatment. To
oversimplify somewhat, the revisions will impose a sliding scale
of priorities based on the degree of power the secured party
takes over the collateral, with the greatest power, termed "con-
trol," having the highest priority.4 '
145. U.C.C. § 9-115(4)(d) (1994). Security interests granted by other debtors will be
perfectable by filing, among other methods. Id. § 9-115(4)(c).
146. Id. § 9-115(5)(d).
147. See infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text.
148. U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(a). Security interests taken by a securities intermediary in a
customer's investment property held through such securities intermediary will have
priority over all other security interests no matter how perfected, but such a securi-
ties intermediary will always, by definition, have control of such financial assets.
Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 436-38.
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III. OBJECTIFICATION: HEGELIAN POSSESSION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE PARADIGM OF THE PHYSICAL METAPHOR
The 1994 revisions to Articles 8 and 9 offer an alternative to
the physical metaphor without abandoning the property aspects
of securities investments. They do this by supplementing the
traditional paradigm of ownership as physical custody with a
new concept of securities holding called "control." Interestingly
enough, the concept of control is almost identical to Benedict's
concept of "dominion." The significant difference is that the revi-
sions recognize control not as the only or even archetypical mode
of creating or evidencing property rights, but as merely the full-
est and most adequate way of doing so, entitled to the highest
priority.
A. Attachment and Perfection
Although Article 9 security interests can only be created by
contract,1"9 they are not merely contract interests but property
interests in specific identifiable collateral. This means, among
other things, that, in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, a
secured party does not share in the estate pro rata with general
creditors but is entitled to distribution out of earmarked assets.
Consequently, Article 9 makes a distinction between attachment
and perfection of security interests.15
Roughly speaking, when we say a security interest has at-
tached, we mean that it has become enforceable only against the
debtor who created the security interest and a discrete class of
other parties.15" ' Perfection means that the attached security
149. Article 9 "applies to security interests created by contract." U.C.C. § 9-102(2)
(1977). One of the elements of attachment (i.e., creation) of a security interest is
that there is an agreement. Id. § 9-203(1)(a).
150. Compare id. § 9-203 (attachment) with id. § 9-304 (perfection).
151. The four elements of attachment for security interests in collateral other than
investment securities are located in U.C.C. § 9-203 (1977). The security interest
must be established by agreement between the debtor and the secured party (i.e.,
security interests, unlike judgment liens, are voluntary conveyances; they are pur-
chases), id. § 9-203(1)(a); either there must be a written security agreement contain-
ing a description of the collateral signed by the debtor or the debtor must give the
secured party possession of the collateral (i.e., the security agreement must be evi-
denced by one of two formalities in the nature of a statute of frauds), id. § 9-
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interest is also enforceable against subsequent lien creditors
(including the debtor's bankruptcy trustee) and certain other
parties.'52 Consequently, one can have unperfected but at-
tached security interests in many categories of collateral, 15 3 but
there is no such thing as a perfected but unattached security
interest.
Section 9-201 recites the usual derivation rule that, absent a
statutory exception to the contrary, later-in-time claimants (such
as purchasers, secured parties, and other transferees) take sub-
ject to first-in-time security interests.5 Nevertheless, the ef-
fect of sections 9-301 and 9-312 read together is that unperfected
security interests prevail against very few later-in-time third
parties.'55 They lose to perfected security interests; lien credi-
tors; bulk transferees; nonordinary course buyers of farm prod-
203(1)(a) cmts. 3, 5; the debtor must have rights in the collateral (i.e., there must
be some object in which the debtor can assert a property interest, a special case of
the derivation rule), id. § 9-203(1)(c); and the secured party must have given value
(i.e., in order to form the contract, consideration must be given by the secured par-
ty), id. § 9-203(1)(b)."
The 1977 amendments to Articles 8 and 9 moved the requirements for
attachment and perfection of security interests in investment securities to Article 8.
The 1994 revisions of Articles 8 and 9 have moved the requirements of attachment
and perfection of investment securities back into Article 9.
My categorical statements are roughly true; unperfected security interests are
enforceable (i.e., have priority) against a few third parties such as buyers of goods
out of the ordinary course of business.
152. As usual, the UCC never states this general principle in so many words.
Rather, it adopts the transactional approach and describes the priority of unperfected
security interests vis-A-vis other parties in Part 3 of Article 9, id. § 9-301, the prior-
ity of conflicting security interests, id. § 9-312, and priorities against other parties,
id. §§ 9-306, -310.
153. People often think that the elements of attachment and perfection under the
1977 Article 8 are identical, so that it is impossible to have an attached but unper-
fected security interest in investment securities. This is an overstatement. Section
8-321(2) provides that attached Article 8 security interests are always automatically
perfected. Id. § 8-321(2). While it is impossible to create an attached yet unperfected
security interest ab initio under Article 8, perfection can lapse resulting in an un-
perfected yet attached security interest. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 122, at
578 n.79.
The revision of Article 8 removed this anomaly by moving the attachment of
security interests in investment securities back into § 9-203. See U.C.C. § 9-203
(1994).
154. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977).
155. See id. §§ 9-301, -312.
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ucts who give value and take delivery; transferees of investment
property, intangibles, and accounts who give value in good
faith;156 and perfected secured parties.5 7 To oversimplify, un-
perfected security interests are enforceable against the debtor,
donees, and knowledgeable buyers out of the ordinary course of
most types of goods. In effect, once one creates a security inter-
est, the negotiation rule becomes the default rule for most
transferees, and the derivation rule the exception that must be
established. That is, most transferees take more than the debtor
had to transfer-the encumbered value of the collateral as well
as the debtor's equity-unless the true owner of the encumbered
value (the secured party) can establish that the interest has
been perfected. Once the security interest is perfected, however,
the default rule is reversed. Generally, a perfected security in-
terest is enforceable (i.e., prior) to subsequent transferees, un-
less the transferee can establish that it comes within one of the
exceptions.
Why is this so?
B. Sensuous Grasping As an Example, Rather Than the Norm,
of Objectification
As I have explained, the traditional interpretation of the poli-
cy underlying perfection by filing under Article 9 is that pledg-
ing-the sensuous grasping of a tangible thing-is the norm of
property ownership, generally, and security interests, specifical-
ly.'58 In the Baird and Jackson interpretation, it is the "best"
evidence of a property interest.159 Where sensuous grasping is
impossible or impracticable, filing is permitted as a substitute
on the grounds that it can evince the same properties that sen-
suous grasping is presumed to evince-unambiguous information
concerning the property interests of the secured party.
There is a second way of defending the filing system that does
not presume that sensuous grasping is the unproblematic norm
and then ask what other legal relations have properties similar
156. Id. § 9-301(1).
157. Id. § 9-312(5).
158. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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to sensuous grasping. Rather, it identifies sensuous grasping, at
best, as an example, and not necessarily the best example, of
either property as a whole or at least that element of property
that traditionally goes by the name of "possession." We should
ask: 'What do we mean by property, and how do we distinguish
it from contract?" "What purpose is possession supposed to
serve?" "How and why does sensuous grasping, which many of
us intuitively believe can serve as a mode of possession, perform
this fimction?" "Can other devices be used to accomplish this
purpose?"
The difference between my approach and the ostensible own-
ership approach is subtle but significant. One might be tempted
to argue that one is likely to identify the same significant ele-
ments of property whether one analyzes sensuous grasping as
the norm of possession (i.e., the traditional approach) or only as
an intuitively simple example of an ideal of possession as
objectification. This may be true, but, if one mistakenly identi-
fies an example with the norm, one risks mistaking elements
that are accidental, in the sense of unique to the example, with
those that are essential to the category. It is precisely this error
that characterizes the traditional property metaphor paradigm
of sensuous grasp. And, it is precisely this error that made
prerevision Article 8 unworkable.'60
For example, in their article Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property,6' Baird and Jackson at first blush seem
to take an approach similar to mine, in that they analyze the
appropriate modes for perfecting security interests in various
forms of collateral based on the hypothesis that the purpose of
perfection is to limit the risks of subsequent creditors by provid-
ing information.'62 They argue that "[riules that increase the
information about property ownership, however, bring their own
costs .... These costs must be weighed against the bene-
fits."'63 They purport, as I do, to analyze perfection formalities
in light of an external theoretical rationale, albeit their rationale
160. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
161. Baird & Jackson, supra note 94, at 299.
162. Id. at 300.
163. Id. at 301.
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(notification as a priority rule to promote economic efficiency) is
quite different from mine (objectification as an essential element
of property in order to protect autonomy and promote self actu-
alization). Baird and Jackson do not, however, follow through to
the implications of their approach because they are entrapped in
the physical metaphor. They continue to assume that custody is
the norm and recording an exception that needs explaining.
Recording systems are seen as a supplement to custodial re-
gimes.'64 They do not question, as I do, whether, and under
what circumstances, custody can and does adequately convey
information. Rather, custody is presumed to be simple, clear,
and unambiguous as a general rule.'65 One problem with a cus-
todial regime is that it is expensive. In addition, custodial re-
gimes make temporal divisions of property rights (such as be-
tween a debtor and secured party, lessor and lessee, life estate
and remainderperson) problematic and tracing of certain claims
difficult.'66 Baird and Jackson are not particularly troubled by
the fact that some forms of property are intangible and cannot
be grasped because we could treat copyrights, patents, etc. the
way we treat certain other forms of intangibles, such as debts
and investment securities, and make the physical metaphor
literal by reifying them into pieces of property that could then be
grasped.'67 Their analysis of the appropriateness of reification
revolves around whether these types of intangibles are usually
owned by one person or are subject to numerous property
claims 6 ' and ignores the absurdity of presuming that custody
is the norm even when property is intangible.
The Hegelian approach holds out the promise of replacing the
physical metaphor because it is not a simple negation of the
physical metaphor that can serve as a reinstatement. Rather, it
is a sublation. It preserves the true moment of the physical
paradigm while negating the false moment. On the one hand, it
recognizes that physical custody is not necessarily irrelevant to
property analysis because, in some circumstances, it can perform
164. Id. at 308.
165. See id. at 302-03.
166. Id. at 303.
167. Id. at 310-11.
168. Id. at 311.
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certain logical functions. On the other hand, it rejects the physi-
cal metaphor's claim to universal validity.
C. The Logic of Property
1. Classical Liberalism and Autonomy
The existing property regime of the UCC can be justified in
terms of the classical liberal policy of furthering autonomy.169
A review of Karl Llewellyn's writings shows that he thought
that the common law did not adequately distinguish the contract
and property aspects of sales."7 ° It treated all of sales as a sub-
set of the property relationship of conveyancing of title and did
not recognize that certain aspects of sales, such as risk of loss,
were better analyzed as merely contractual in nature. This ap-
proach made the law of sales simultaneously too objective and
too subjective.1"' Under traditional liberal analysis, in order to
further personal autonomy, contract law should be subjective, in
that the parties should be able freely to bind themselves by
contract however they want. Autonomy, however, also demands
that no one be bound without her consent. Property rights affect
third parties, such as creditors, who are not parties to a convey-
ancing contract. Property interests should be objective 1 -in
169. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 15-19.
170. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES xiv-xv,
64 (1930); SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 2; Llewellyn, supra
note 118, at 725; Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 12-15, 23-33.
171. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 13-15.
172. In an earlier article, I showed how the word "objective" has many different
and inconsistent meanings and is often used sloppily. For clarity, I offered a taxono-
my of various different meanings. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (1992). In this Article, I use the word "objectivity" in two ways. First, in this
paragraph, I am referring to what I have called "Community Objectivity." This is
the sense of objectivity as the polar opposite of subjectivity understood as private,
idiosyncratic, and unique to one or a number of identified individuals. In this sense,
objective means public-recognizable by third parties through intersubjective or com-
munity-accepted criteria. Secondly, I refer to what I have called 'Philosophical Objec-
tivity"-that which relates to objects understood as anything other than, or external
to, a self-conscious will (i.e., a subject). In this case, I am referring to my assertion
that the legal category of property concerns relations between legal subjects with
respect to the possession, enjoyment, and use of an external object. Neither of these
meanings of objectivity carries any necessary implications of universal essential
truth.
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the sense of being intersubjectively determinable-in order to
compromise between the autonomy interests of the parties to a
conveyance and the noncontracting third parties who are affect-
ed by the conveyance. On the one hand, the title rule of the
common law of sales overly restrained the freedom of the parties
with respect to the contract aspects of sales. On the other hand,
the property aspects of property (i.e., the location of ownership
in the form of title) was determined by the subjective whim of
the conveyancers despite the objective manifestation of the actu-
al indicia of property rights.'73
This analysis is powerful, but it is limited in that it arguably
depends on a liberal presupposition of human nature as atomis-
tic individuality with a natural right of negative liberty as per-
sonal autonomy (and, to a lesser extent, a natural right to prop-
erty). These presuppositions are, perhaps, not so universally
shared in our society as they once were. Hegelian philosophy
neither presupposes nor rejects the liberal concept of personali-
ty-it critiques it. Nor is it based on empirical observations of
presumptions. Hegelian political theory does not necessarily
reject liberal concerns for individuality, autonomy, and negative
liberty but seeks to supplement them with an understanding of
community, ethical life, and positive freedom. Hegel's political
theory is a sublation of liberalism and liberal property theory; it
seeks to preserve its true moment while negating and supersed-
ing its false claims to universality. Hegel claimed not to presup-
pose any natural right of property but to ask what logical func-
tion property serves.
2. Hegelian Personality Theory
To understand what Hegel meant by property, we should
return to his theory of its role in his dialectical logic.'74 Hegel
173. Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 3, at 15-19.
174. The following is intended as only the most rudimentary introduction to this
complex and subtle theory. I present much more detailed exegeses in SCHROEDER,
THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2,
at 245-46; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2, at 841-73; Schroeder,
Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 114-53; see also Peter Benson, Abstract Right and
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary
Contract Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989); Alan Brudner, The Unity of Proper-
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argued that property rights are a logically necessary step in the
development of the individual, freedom, and the State. According
to Hegel, legal subjectivity can only be intersubjectivity medi-
ated by objectivity. 5 He thought that the concept of the auton-
omous individual posited by liberalism was an unstable idea
because it implicitly (but logically) always presupposed and
depended on the existence of other individuals and objects. By
this he meant that the autonomous individual posited by liberal-
ism can only constitute himself as a legal actor-a sub-
ject-capable of bearing legal rights and thereby capable of exer-
cising his autonomy through recognition of such rights by anoth-
er legal subject. As a consequence, Hegelian philosophy is in-
tensely and desperately erotic: we are driven by an insatiable
desire to be recognized as human beings by others whom we
recognize as human beings. This means that we do not merely
seek to assert our own rights. We passionately desire to accord
rights to others in order to raise them to the dignity of human
beings so that their opinion of us counts. In other words, I only
truly see myself as a person in my reflection in the eyes of my
beloved at the moment he simultaneously sees himself reflected
in mine.
Property is the first stage of a process by which the logical
concept of the autonomous, abstract individual takes on individ-
uating characteristics making her recognizable to others.'76
This enables her to become a legal subjet capable of interrelat-
ing to others and bearing rights enforceable against others.'"
Hegel argued that this function of recognizability, which he
called property, logically required three elements: possession,
enjoyment, and alienation (in the sense of exchange of objects
external to the owning subject).' These elements should not
ty Law, 4 CAN. JL. & JURIS. 3 (1991); Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of
Property, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1199 (1989).
175. French psychoanalytical philosopher Jacques Lacan came to a similar conclu-
sion. See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, Bun-
dle-O-Stix, supra note 2, at 249; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2,
at 819; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 154.
176. Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 133.
177. See id.
178. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-71 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
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be confused with any specific empirical manifestation of the ele-
ments but with extremely abstract logical and Symbolic con-
cepts-i.e., exactly what Baird and Jackson condemn as
metaphysics.
Before going any further, it is useful to concentrate on what
Hegel meant by an object of property. Too frequently, legal writ-
ers adopt the physical metaphor and assume that an object must
be a tangible thing or at least that tangible things are archetyp-
ical objects.'79 Nothing could be further from the philosophical
notion of objectivity. The term "object" refers to the philosophic
concept of anything that is other than the subject, which the
subject can negate as not himself. Among the examples given by
Hegel of potential objects of property are "[i]ntellectual [geistigel
accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances
(such as sermons, masses, prayers, and blessings at consecra-
tions), inventions, and the like, become objects [Gegenstdndel of
contract."8 ° In continental philosophical discourse, the word
"external" contains no implications of physicality, generally, or
physical separation from the subject, specifically.' 8 ' In other
words, although tangible things can be objects, it is not their
tangibility that establishes their objectivity; rather, it is nega-
tion by the subject that does it.
Hegel argued that possession is a necessary element of prop-
erty because it is the way that the abstract person becomes
identified with individuating characteristics and, therefore, be-
comes recognizable by other persons.' 2 Because objects cannot
179. See Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2, at 239.
180. HEGEL, supra note 178, § 43. One should note that, although Hegel thought
that the concept of a full property necessarily included exclusive rights to possess,
use, and alienate the object of property, this did not mean that every empirical
manifestation of property had to as well. For example, although Hegel believed that
our bodies are objects in which we have a property, he argued that we do not have
the absolute right to alienate our bodies by selling ourselves into slavery, id. §§ 65-
68, or committing suicide, id. § 70.
181. See Seyla Benhabib, Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of
Hegel's Abstract Right, in THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: STUDIES IN HEGEL'S POLIT-
ICAL PHILOSOPHY 159, 162 (Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1984).
182. The other two Hegelian elements required for a full property are enjoyment
and alienation. See HEGEL, supra note 178, §§ 52-53; SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND
THE FASCES, supra note 2; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 2, at
858; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 2, at 133.
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be limited to, or even typified by, tangible things, the Hegelian
element of possession cannot be reduced to, or even typified by,
sensuous grasping, even though the abstract concept of posses-
sion might occasionally be empirically manifested in the sensu-
ous grasp of specific tangible things. Possession is the more
general concept of an objectively recognizable identification of a
specific object as being owned by a specific legal subject with the
right and power to exclude others from the object. Because the
logic of property, according to Hegel, is to make the owner recog-
nizable by others, the claim to ownership that is possession
cannot be totally subjective in the sense of private to the so-
called owner. Rather, it must be somehow public and objective in
the sense that possession is intersubjectively recognizable by the
relevant legal community.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, the UCC, and much contem-
porary legal scholarship, usually conflates the more general
English term "possession" with its more narrow meaning of
One occasionally finds statements that Hegers theory of property is one of occu-
pancy and that Hegel thought first occupancy served as justification of individual
property rights. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 386-
89 (1988). This is a major misunderstanding. Indeed, it is a strawman which is set
up solely for the purpose of criticizing the Hegelian theory of property.
This misunderstanding comes from a misreading of the following sentence: "That
a thing [Sache] belongs to the person who happens to be the first to take possession
of it is an immediately self-evident and superfluous determination, because a second
party cannot take possession of what is already the property of someone else."
HEGEL, supra note 178, § 50 (footnote omitted).
Although, at first blush, this might seem to be a concept of justification based
on occupancy, the sentence has a very different meaning read in context. It is mere-
ly a truism following from the definition of possession as "first-in-time, first-in-right."
In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues for the logical necessity of
a property regime. In order for abstract persons to become subjects-the first step
on the road to individuality and- freedom-they must own some property. Unlike
Locke, however, Hegel does not have a theory of the justification of the property
rights of any specific individual. Specific allocations of property are a matter of
Gesetz, positive law determined by practical considerations, rather than by logic.
That is, when Locke argued that a person who commingles her labor with a physical
thing obtains a property right in that thing, he argued that the owner's property is
rightful. When Hegel states that a person who possesses property has the right to
possession enforceable against other persons, he is merely giving a partial definition
of the right of possession-it is more than the mere accidental holding of a thing by
a person, it is enforceable against rival claimants. He does not argue that such
possession is rightful.
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physical custody, preferably in the form of sensuous grasp. The
English word "possession," like its German cognate "Besitz," is
more expansively defined as occupancy or ownership.1" In-
deed, the English word might be even less physicalist than the
German used by Hegel.
"Besitz" is derived from the same root as "Sitz" (sitting or
seat) and implies occupancy, in the sense of the place where one
physically sits or camps. German mythographer Erich Neumann
suggests that the concept of possession as sitting derives from
the nomadic nature of ancient German tribes who only tempo-
rarily possessed any specific piece of land by camping.'84
The English word "possession," on the other hand, derives
from a root meaning "power" and is etymologically related to
such concepts as possibility and potency."s In this light, pos-
183. 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 172 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.,
2d ed. 1989).
184. Neumann, who has a Jungian perspective on mythology, goes further and
suggests that Besitz also invokes images of the mother goddesses worshipped by the
Germans and displayed in their camps. See NEUMANN, supra note 123, at 98. The
Sitz was not just the generic concept of seat; it also referred specifically to the
king's throne, which, in turn, was identified with the mother's lap. See id. at 98-99.
German gods and German kings were depicted seated in the lap of the great mother
goddess in the same way as the Egyptians depicted Horus seated in the lap of his
mother Isis and Catholics depict Jesus seated in Mary's lap. See id. at 99. This
identification is specifically reflected in religious terminology. Isis, the name of the
great ancient Egyptian goddess, means throne. Id. at 98-99. Even today, one of the
Blessed Virgin's traditional titles is "Seat of Wisdom."
Neumann's point is that we confuse the source of power in property. The king
thinks that his seat is a throne because he is a king, whereas he is only king be-
cause he sits on the throne. Similarly, men speak of possessing women in inter-
course, but the man who thinks he possesses the woman is, in fact, possessed by his
desire.
In other words, from the Jungian perspective, in possession, the object controls
the subject, not the other way around. This is consistent with Iegel's analysis. The
subject does not preexist the legal concept of property; rather, it is constituted
through property. We do not possess things because we are subjects; we are subjects
because we possess things that make us recognizable to others.
Possession standing alone, however, is inadequate to the function of property in
the development of the individual and the actualization of freedom. The possessor is
dependent on her objects and, therefore, is not free. Consequently, Hegel argues that
the owner must assert mastery over the object through enjoyment and ultimately
assert her indifference to the object through alienation. See HEGEL, supra note 178,
§§ 59-70. Through alienation in contract, the person substitutes interdependence with
other human subjects for dependence on objects, thereby achieving subjectivity, com-
munity, and the opportunity for human development.
185. See JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS: A DISCURSIVE DIC-
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session relates not to physicality per se but to the power of the
subject with respect to the objects and other subjects. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court's terminology in Benedict *v.
Ratner'8 -- dominion (from dominus, lord"'8 )-may in fact be
more appropriate because it does not carry the unfortunate mod-
ern physicalist connotation of possession.
Thought of in this way, sensuous grasping cannot epitomize or
otherwise serve as the archetype of possession. Hegel makes
clear that, although the sensuous grasp of tangible things is one
of the most determinative forms of possession, it is simulta-
neously the most contingent and, therefore, the least adequate
form."s Mere sensuous grasping has the advantage of being
easily recognizable, but it can be destroyed by a thief or bully-a
brute fact subject to brute force. The very fact that we tar the
person who wrongfully wrests goods from the sensuous grasp of
the rightful owner with the conclusary pejorative "thief' indi-
cates that we do not identify possession with the grasping itself;
rather, grasping is at most a specific manifestation of the more
general concept of the right to possession. This, of course, is
precisely my and Phillips's point as to the lack of information
conveyed by custody. In other words, by possession, Hegel meant
any relationship of a subject with respect to a thing that causes
others to recognize the individuals relationship-such as chang-
ing or marking the thing as the individual's own in a way that is
recognizable and legally recognized by others.'89
The most full form of property is the complete, unfettered, and
exclusive rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation. Proba-
bly the only true example of this type of property in our legal
system is the allodial estate, which the sovereign theoretically
holds in realty. Most parties have lesser manifestations of prop-
erty. Under Hegelian analysis, both the debtor and secured
party to a security interest have property rights, although they
do not have the most full and adequate manifestations of proper-
ty. In a hypothecation, the debtor has possession, in the sense of
TIONARY OF INDO-EUROPEAN ROOTS 326, 579 (1984).
186. 268 U.S. 353, 362 (1925).
187. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 183, at 949.
188. HEGEL, supra note 178, § 52.
189. Id. § 58.
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the right to have physical custody of a tangible object, or is oth-
erwise recognized as the owner of an intangible object. She has
the right to enjoy the object in the sense of using or collecting it.
Article 9 gives her the power to alienate her equity interest and
sometimes the secured party's interest in the collateral, despite
contractual restrictions to the contrary. 90 These rights are all
immediate and contingent, however, in that their continued
existence is subject to the condition that she satisfy the secured
obligation. The secured party's rights of possession (through
repossession), 9' enjoyment (through collection or strict
foreclosure),'92 and alienation (through foreclosure sale).9 are
inchoate because they are all contingent upon a future default
by the debtor that may never occur. Consequently, the secured
party's rights remain merely contractual in nature unless they
are somehow immediately objectified. An unperfected security
interest is objective only to a very small class of people-the
debtor and parties with actual notice. Consequently, unperfected
security interests are enforceable against certain knowledgeable
buyers'94 and against the debtors' donees, who do not act as
independent legal subjects but inherit the status of their do-
nor.'95 The necessity for objectification explains the require-
ment of perfection as a condition of enforceability against other
parties.
190. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1977).
191. Id. § 9-503.
192. Id. §§ 9-502, -505(2).
193. Id. §§ 9-504 to -505.
194. Id. § 9-301(1). Section 9-301(i) provides that unperfected security interests are
subordinate to, among others, buyers of farm products, buyers out of the ordinary
course of business of other goods, and certain assignees of accounts and assignments
to the extent they give value and do not have knowledge of the security interest. Id.
By negative pregnant, such purchasers with knowledge take subject to the security
interest under the general derivation principle of UCC § 9-201.
195. Donees take subject to an unperfected security interest granted by their donor-
debtor under the general derivation principle of UCC § 9-201. Id. § 9-201. Under
Hegelian theory, a donee is not asserting her subjectivity, i.e., acting as an end to
her own means; rather, she passively serves as the means to the ends of the donor.
HEGEL, supra note 178, §§ 71, 76-77, 80; see also Brudner, supra note 174, at 34
(noting that only an exchange in which donor and donee simultaneously recognize each
other as an end is a donor's claim to exclusive control authoritatively validated).
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3. Hegelianism and Pragmatism
The Hegelian dialectic only purports to explain the abstract
logic of concepts and structures but does not answer specific,
concrete questions of legal policy or daily life.' This is why
pragmatism is a necessary correlate of Hegelian idealism. In
other words, although Hegel would argue that the general con-
cept of property logically requires the element of possession-in
the sense of an objectively recognizable claim of ownership by a
subject of an object with the right to exclude others-the actual
form of possession in any given society falls within the province
of positive law. In this interpretation, perfection of a security
interest through filing of a financing statement would be a form
of possession through marking recognized by the positive law of
the UCC. Filing is not a second-best substitution for possession
as exemplified in the norm of sensuous grasping; rather, through
positive law, filing itself becomes a form of possession.
In this analysis, regardless of whether the drafters of the
UCC thought that they were disaggregating title, the system
they created does not necessarily require a rejection of the uni-
tary view of title. The imagery of disaggregation is captured in
the familiar metaphoric cich6 that modern property is merely a
"bundle of sticks."9 7 One can interpret custody as a special
case, or even as a paradigmatic case, of one of the indicia of
unitary title. For the purposes of the priorities of security inter-
ests vis-a-vis other creditors, analogies to custody or grasp are
permitted, but they are not necessary for the function of posses-
sion to be satisfied. Further, insofar as the secured party has
that property interest called a security interest, it does have an
enforceable right of possession, actually or metaphorically
through dominion, but it is subject to the condition precedent of
196. As Richard Hyland has written in the context of discussing Elements of the
Philosophy of Right:
Hegel described what he believed to be the ever-recurring forms of self-
reflection, at an individual and societal level. He did not dream of dictat-
ing to us either their substantive content or the resolution of conflicts
between the individual and society. Hegel's theory leaves us free to re-
solve these issues for ourselves.
Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User's Manual, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1735, 1741 (1989).
197. I explore this metaphor in Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 2, at 283-90.
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default.
In other words, the alternate mode of perfection by filing can
be seen as a reaffirmation of the unitary view of title. Property
does not consist of a bundle of unrelated rights that can be
disaggregated and reassembled at will. Property consists of an
identifiable whole, but the elements of the whole can move at
different temporal speeds as long as the parties anticipate that
the whole will eventually or potentially be reassembled. Per-
fection through filing does not represent a separation of the
property rights of possession and the property rights of title.
Rather, it reflects a theory that all property rights need some
form of possession-objectively recognizable identification of the
object to the subject with the right to exclude others. This theory
does not conflate the Symbolic possession of the property inter-
est in the object with sensuous grasp of the Real object itself.
The Hegelian concept of possession can be used both to ex-
plain and critique some areas of property law that seem anoma-
lous when considered within ostensible ownership doctrine.
Probably the most obvious of such apparent anomalies, as raised
by Baird and Jackson,9 ' is the lack of any perfection require-
ment for leases and other arrangements in which a noncustodial
party has enforceable property rights. From a Hegelian view-
point, the continued existence of this apparent anomaly can be
explained if the lessor's noncustodial interest is otherwise objec-
tively manifest, in the sense of being observable or at least dis-
coverable by a third party creditor of the custodial lessee from
evidence other than the self-serving subjective statements of the
custodial party.'99
Mooney suggests just such a defense for leases."' If a credi-
tor wishes to take a security interest in equipment or other
goods in the custody of a debtor, it can investigate the
198. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
199. Baird and Jackson assert that there is no objective way for a creditor to learn
of a leasehold or other bailment. In the case of leases, "third parties have no easy
way of discovering these divisions." Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 178. In the
case of purchase money security interests, "the financer of the inventory had no
independent means of learning about the contractual arrangements between [the
bailor and the bailee/debtor]." Id. at 200.
200. Mooney, supra note 26, at 748-51.
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equipment's provenance or chain of title."1 The potential credi-
tor can demand from the debtor some evidence of the origin of
the equipment, such as a bill of sale or other receipt. The credi-
tor can then question the source of the equipment about the
nature of the transaction by which the debtor obtained custody.
In this way, the potential creditor has some ability to ascertain
the existence of an adverse interest that is not totally dependent
on the subjective statements of the debtor. °2 The same reason-
ing could explain in part the traditional solicitude for purchase
money fmanciers-at least when the financer is the seller, rath-
201. Id.
202. In the teacher's manual to their casebook, which I assume from its style
consists mainly of their lecture notes, Baird and Jackson flippantly dismiss this
approach:
But what if you want to buy a personal computer sitting in my
office. How do you know its mine-that is, how do you know if you pay
for it, some company won't swoop down later and take it away, saying
the computer belonged to it, and that I had no right to sell it? You
might ask for the bill of sale. But rm a careless guy, and I might not
have it any more. What else? You look to see that I have it in my office.
Anything else? No.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMiAS H. JACKSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL To ACCOMPANY CAS-
ES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIAL ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 9 (2d
ed. 1987).
They do not consider, as Mooney implicitly does, that, even in the absence of a
bill of sale, the potential buyer could ask the computer holder for the name of his
seller and then ask the seller about the nature of the transaction. Of course, if the
computer holder cannot produce this evidence, the potential buyer can still protect
itself by lowering the price he will offer or put a portion of the purchase price in
escrow for whatever time the buyer deems sufficient to smoke out any competing
claimant.
In other words, Baird and Jackson's snide comment does not go to the validity
of Mooney's point that provenance can be, and often is, investigated. Indeed, such
investigation is a standard part of the "due diligence" undertaken in large corporate
mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, various forms of "hold-backs" and escrows are
customarily used to protect buyers against undiscovered potential risks such as rival
claimants. For example, fine arts is an industry that has developed elaborate sys-
tems for investigating and evidencing provenance.
The valid issue Baird and Jackson implicitly raise, however, is the pragmatic
one of whether this is the better way of protecting the competing interests of buy-
ers, sellers, and third party claimants. Lower prices and escrows will only be im-
posed by the buyer if the seller is "a careless guy" who does not keep his bills of
sale. Economic theory, however, would indicate that, if careless sellers will receive a
lower purchase price or have part of the purchase price escrowed, there will be a
strong incentive to be careful and keep records of provenance. Nevertheless, there
might be cheaper and/or less burdensome ways of achieving this purpose.
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er than financer, of the collateral. It cannot, however, justify the
nonperfection of other forms of noncustodial security interests.
An investigation of the past chain of title of an object will not re-
veal the existence of a nonpurchase money hypothecation.
Note that although my Hegelian approach can explain the
minimum logic for a property regime, it cannot answer the prag-
matic question of whether we, as a society, judge this specific
legal regime adequate. In my example, one might decide on an
abstract logical basis that the unperfected interests of lessors
are theoretically objective and, therefore, property. Nevertheless,
society might pragmatically decide that investigation of prove-
nance is too difficult, time consuming, and subject to fraud by
dishonest debtors, who can forge fake receipts or collude with
dishonest suppliers to be considered sufficiently objective to
justify enforcement of all leases against all competing interests.
In other words, leases that can be discovered through investiga-
tion of provenance might be minimally objective and possessory
in a Hegelian sense, but they are not necessarily the most ade-
quate or full form of possessory interests.
Moreover, if lease financing is a significant rival for secured
financing in some industries, it might also make pragmatic
sense to require the same form of objectification for all property
interests. We might, therefore, pragmatically decide that, with
respect to some industries, or some types of collateral, creditors
should have to engage in only one form of search to discover all
potentially rival interests. Why make creditors search both the
secured financing records and investigate provenance if it would
not impose significant hardship on lessors also to record their
interests on a certificate of title? On my Zabar's principle, al-
though it might be logical to locate bagels with other baked
goods, smoked salmon with other appetizers, and cream cheese
with other cheeses, customers hungry for a traditional New York
brunch might prefer to be able to take one number to purchase
bagels, smoked salmon, and cream cheese rather than having to
wait in three lines on Sunday morning.
For example, we have decided to require perfection formalities
for all property interests--ownership, leasehold, and security
interests, custodial as well as noncustodial-in aircraft and
airplane engines and equipment, which are frequently financed
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by sale-leasebacks and secured credit."3 Similarly, although
the UCC does not require that leases in automobiles be perfect-
ed as a condition of enforceability against creditors, both the
interests in lessors (as owners) and secured parties (as
lienholders) must be noted on automobile certificates of title
under many state certificate of title statutes. 2 4 In other indus-
tries, however, we may decide that the expense imposed on the
noncustodial party would not justify the investigative cost sav-
ings to third parties.
Of course, these pragmatic decisions depend on precisely the
type of difficult to verify empirical questions that I have been
seeking to avoid. But this is an inevitable characteristic of all
pragmatic decisions. All we can do is develop a logical structure
to help frame the type of pragmatic questions we need to ask,
and to develop a theory of political legitimacy for the process by
which the pragmatic decision will be reached. Traditionally, in
our political system, such decisions are considered to be within
the competency of the legislature. My criticism of Baird and
Jackson is not so much that they raise a hypothesis that re-
quires empirical investigation but that they assume the very
empirical data on which a demonstration of their hypothesis
depends.
4. Perfection: Filing and Control
Another example of using pragmatic reasoning to require
more than minimum objectification to accomplish a more ade-
quate form of possession is the proposed priority regime for secu-
rity interests in investment securities contained in revised Arti-
cles 8 and 9. Revised Articles 8 and 9 permit a variety of liberal-
ized perfection alternatives for security interests in investment
securities. If the debtor is a broker-dealer, perfection can be
automatic.0 5 Filing is permitted in the case of other types of
203. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 49 (1995); see Schroeder & Carlson, su-
pra, note 111, at 254-59 (discussing perfection and priority interests in replacement
engines).
204. See, e.g., UNIF. MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT
§§ 20-22 (1955).
205. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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debtors. Both of these are examples of a minimum form of
Hegelian possession through positive law-intersubjectively
recognizable identification of object to subject.
In the case of automatic perfection, objectification consists of
the general knowledge of the lending industry that securities
held by broker-dealers are customarily subject to multiple com-
peting noncustodial property claims. Note, however, that the
intersubjective knowledge that is objectively known by the lend-
ers goes only to the existence of competing interests generally,
rather than to any specific property interests of any identified
party. Consequently, revised Articles 8 and 9 only make these
interests generally, but not specifically, enforceable. All security
parties who rely only on automatic perfection and do not take
one of the other objectifying acts permitted by the statute there-
fore share pro rata. °6
Perhaps more interestingly, the revisions further provide that
secured parties who take control of investment securities have
priority over security interests perfected by alternate means
(such as automatic perfection)." 7 "Control" is defined as a vari-
ety of devices that give the secured party power to dispose of the
property without the further cooperation of the debtor."0 As
we have seen, although physical custody can be a form of
Hegelian possession, it is not the archetype of possession." 9
Similarly, although actual physical custody of a securities certifi-
cate can be an element of control, it is not the archetypical form
of control. Indeed, when a certificate is registered in the name of
a specific person, mere physical custody does not even constitute
control unless it is accompanied by the appropriate
indorsements.
It is also significant that the forms of control defined by the
revisions are all intersubjectively recognizable. For example, one
form of investment property governed by the revisions is a new
property interest known as a security entitlement.210 For the
206. U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(e) (1994).
207. Id. § 9-115(5)(a). A "controlling" secured party who is not the debtor's securi-
ties intermediary, however, will be subordinate to the securities intermediary who is
always deemed to have "control."
208. Id. § 9-115(1)(e).
209. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
210. "'Security entitlement' means the rights and property interest of an entitle-
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purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that this security
entitlement is the property right that an investor has when she
owns her securities indirectly through her broker or other finan-
cial intermediary, the normal form of securities holding in this
country. If control by a secured party is thought of only as the
power to dispose of the collateral without the further act of the
debtor,21 ' then, theoretically, a debtor could give a secured par-
ty control by signing an irrevocable power of attorney to give in-
structions to the broker or other financial intermediary.
12
Such an arrangement, however, could be kept entirely private
between the debtor and the secured party until such time as the
secured party chose to use its power. Consequently, such private
arrangements do not fall within the defined term "control" for
the purposes of the revisions. In order for a secured party to
obtain control over a securities entitlement, the financial inter-
mediary with whom the securities entitlement is maintained
must agree to obey such instructions.213 In other words, at
least one third party must know of the arrangement and be able
to answer questions asked by other third parties.1
The drafters, in effect, made a pragmatic judgment that secu-
rity interests perfected by control are more public and unambig-
ment holder with respect to a financial asset specified in Part 5." U.C.C. § 8-102(17).
Put simply, in almost all cases when a customer holds her investment assets in an
account at a securities intermediary, she will be deemed not to be the direct holder
of such assets, but a holder of this new sui generis property right.
211. "Obtaining 'control' means that the purchaser has taken whatever steps are
necessary, given the manner in which the securities are held, to place itself in a
position where it can have the securities sold, without further action by the owner."
Id. § 8-106 cmt. 1.
212. Id. § 8-106; Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at
393-95.
213. U.C.C. § 8-106(c).
214. Id. § 8-106(g). The system is not perfect. Under the revisions, the financial in-
termediary has no statutory duty to respond to the inquiries of others, although it
does have to obey instructions from its customers. Once again, this is a purely prag-
matic decision to protect financial intermediaries from being forced to act like a
county clerk and be subject to liabilities to third parties. Nevertheless, when securi-
ties are held indirectly in the form of securities entitlement, creditors are at least on
notice of the financial intermediary and can make inquiry of the financial intermedi-
ary. If a financial intermediary refuses to respond to such a third-party response
and the debtor refuses to instruct the financial intermediary to respond, the creditor
should be suspicious.
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uous than those perfected by automatic perfection and, there-
fore, should be given priority. Similarly, although filing, by vir-
tue of its public nature, is given the status of perfection by posi-
tive law, it does not as adequately serve the possessory function
of excluding others as does control; consequentially, secured
parties who perfect by filing are subordinate to perfection by
control. In other words, although security interests in invest-
ment securities may be minimally objectified through notoriety
or filing, control prevails because it is a more adequate form of
objectification.
5. Benedict v. Ratner Redux
A Hegelian analysis might also offer an aphysicalist reinter-
pretation and partial rehabilitation of some aspects of the appar-
ently physicalist legal doctrines such as ostensible ownership
and the Benedict v. Ratner rule. The traditionalist view, as ex-
pressed by Baird and Jackson, is that property rights are epito-
mized in the sensuous grasping of physical things.215 Property
rights that are not so physically manifest are so misleading as to
be presumptively void. Consequently, nonphysical property
rights must be cured by being given fictive physicality so that
they may be sensuously grasped through the physical meta-
phor.216 An apparent alternative analysis, offered by
Mooney,217 suggests that the common law has not been tradi-
tionally obsessed with physicality per se but rather with fraud.
In a number of notorious cases that smelled of actual but un-
proven fraud, the courts identified certain recurring fact pat-
terns that seemed particularly susceptible to fraudulent manipu-
lation.2 8 Consequently, heightened judicial scrutiny is gen-
erally not appropriate to nonphysical property interests but may
be specifically appropriate to hypothecations and nonrecourse,
non-notification assignments. Although Mooney's conclusion is
much narrower than Baird and Jackson's, it shares the view
215. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
218. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 67, §§ 2.1-.5 (discussing cases).
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that it is the aphysicalist element of hypothecations and certain
assignments that is problematic.
An alternate Hegelan analysis would ask: what does it mean
to say that a hypothecation or assignment has created a proper-
ty interest in the underlying collateral in favor of the secured
party/assignee? Under contemporary commercial law theory,
substance is supposed to control over form. 19 Courts are not
supposed to look solely to the parties' self-serving characteriza-
tion of their legal relationship.
Contemporary case law applying the form over substance
standard in the characterization of security interests tends to
arise when the parties try to avoid Article 9's perfection require-
ments and limitations on remedies or attempt to achieve favor-
able tax or accounting treatment by giving a transaction, which
is in substance a security interest, the name and form of another
type of transaction, such as a lease, a consignment, or a
repoY These are all cases in which it is fairly clear that one
party has some form of property interest in the underlying object
but in which disagreement exists as to what type of property
interest.
But there are other cases where the parties may wish to char-
acterize their transaction as an assignment of some other form
of security interest. This tends to arise when there is a question
as to whether any property interest has been created at all. On
the one hand, contract claims are always inchoate property
claims in that the claimant can obtain a lien on the debtor's
property once the claim is reduced to judgment. On the other
hand, present property claimants are treated more favorably
than contract claimants when there is scarcity, such as when
the debtor goes bankrupt before the contract claimant has ob-
tained a judgment lien. Stated crudely, property remedies tend
219. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1977) (stating that Article 9 "applies .. . to any
transaction (regardless of its form)"); see also id. §§ 2-401(1), 9-202 (stating that title
to secured transactions may pass from the seller to the buyer in any manner agreed
on by the parties and regardless of whether title to collateral is in the secured party
or in the debtor).
220. See Mooney, supra note 26, at 690 & n.24 (stating that, in recent years, many
reported decisions and commentators have grappled with the lease-security interest
dichotomy).
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to include the equitable right to the underlying asset and a high
priority claim to payment of its full value, whereas contract
remedies tend to be limited to money damages payable pro rata
among all the other general creditors. A debtor who both wishes
to maintain unrestricted control over her assets and to prefer
certain favored creditors or friends or to hurt certain unfavored
creditors, has an incentive to disguise general credit arrange-
ments and future gifts as present transfers of property.
This, of course, characterizes one form of the classic fraudu-
lent conveyance or transfer as described by the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act, 1 the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act,222 and section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 There is
reason to think that this also describes the situation of the land-
mark ostensible ownership cases of Clow v. Woods 4 and Bene-
dict v. Ratner."
221. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.LA.. 427 (1985).
222. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4, 7A UJL.A. 639 (1985).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
224. 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
225. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). In Clow, the debtor purported to hypothecate most of his
assets to two accommodation parties the day before the issuance of a judgment
against the debtor in favor of his ex-partner. Clow, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 275. The
debtor still had physical custody of the property a year later when the sheriff tried
to execute the ex-partner's judgment. Id. Although the Supreme Court did not find
actual fraud in Benedict, 268 U.S. at 364-65, the facts raise suspicions. The corpo-
rate debtor purported to assign all of its accounts receivable to the father of the
corporate president four months and three days prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, at
a time when the preference period was four months. Id. at 357. The Court in Bene-
dict considered the date of the assignment agreement to be the relevant date for
determining whether a preference was given with respect to both existing and after-
acquired accounts. See id. at 359-60. Under current law, a transfer cannot occur
until a debtor acquires rights in property. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1988); U.C.C. § 9-
203(1)(c) (1994). Consequently, each account would be deemed a transfer for prefer-
ence purposes at the time it arose. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)(3), a
transfer of receivables within the preference period will nevertheless not be voided if
the secured party does not improve its position during that period. The father-as-
signee in Benedict did not notify the account debtors, collect, ask for an accounting,
or attempt to assert any rights in the accounts until after the debtor went bank-
rupt. See id. at 359-60. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals noted, the trial court
found that "[tihere is nothing in this record to warrant even a suggestion of fraud."
In re Hub Carpet Co., 282 F. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1922), rev'd sub nom. Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
Baird and Jackson also raise the possibility that there might have been actual
fraud in Benedict. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 29, at 56. They carefully point out,
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The courts in those cases chose to describe the transactions as
either presumptively or conclusively fraudulent against creditors
because of their form. Alternatively, the courts could have
asked whether the arrangements created property interests as a
matter of substance. Contract is relatively subjective, and prop-
erty is relatively objective, in that the former is primarily a two-
party transaction, whereas the latter always concerns third
parties because it is enforceable against "the world." Conse-
quently, just because two parties to a contract self-servingly
characterize the transaction as hypothecation, an assignment, or
another form of property interest, it ain't necessarily so. It could
just be a promise to prefer a creditor, to assign an asset in the
future, or to grant a call option on the asset exercisable in the
future. Because property rights affect third parties directly, the
characterization should be objectively determinable by third
parties.
This means that we need to define the essential elements of
property in order to identify when a bona fide, enforceable trans-
fer of a property interest has occurred. This, in turn, requires an
identification of the minimum elements of a property interest. I
have taken the Hegelian approach, which argues that there
must be an element of possession, in addition to the elements of
enjoyment and alienation, for a legal interest to be considered a
full property.' The Hegelian concept of possession involves
the publicly recognizable identification of a specific object to a
specific legal subject with some rights to control, and exclude
others from, the object.' Similarly, the liberal concern with
personal autonomy supports a rule whereby a contract must be
objectified as a condition of enforcement as property against
noncontracting third parties.' Only practical reasoning, not
dialectic logic, can determine what can constitute possession
(objectification) in any given fact situation.
however, that the facts are consistent with other interpretations. "On the other
hand, when an enterprise is near collapse, sometimes the only people willing to lend
it money (on any terms) are insiders." Id.
226. See supra notes 70-91, 225 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 182, 189 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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What the court labeled "dominion" in Benedict v. Ratner might
be reinterpreted as an attempt to identify what it means to have
a property interest in an intangible-did the purported assignee
have any publicly recognizable right to possess, enjoy, or alien-
ate the accounts? Perhaps an effective assignment of the ac-
counts had not been made because the father's (i.e., the
assignee's) rights to the accounts were not possessory: they were
totally subjective, in the sense of being private, and not objec-
tive, in the sense of being publicly recognizable. As there was no
objectification, the creation of a property interest was never com-
pleted. As the arrangement was private, between two persons,
and was not recognizable by third persons, any rights that the
father had should be considered contractual in nature--an exec-
utory agreement to convey a property interest in the future.
Under this reasoning, one does not need to invent theories of
constructive fraud in order to refuse to enforce an inchoate
transfer that was never consummated.
This interpretation is consistent with some of the language of
Benedict v. Ratner. Although the Court held that failure of an
assignment constituted fraud in law, it found that "[i]t does not
raise a presumption of fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively be-
cause of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effec-
tive disposition of title and creation of a lien."'0 Later, the
Court characterized the precedent as pointing "out that a reser-
vation of full control by the mortgagor might well prevent the
effective creation of a lien in the mortgagee."z ' The Court also
spoke of "reserving dominion" as being "inconsistent with the
effective disposition of title." 2 This language is consistent
with a Hegelian analysis. The opinion can be read to have iden-
tified "dominion" as one of the bare minimum elements of prop-
erty. Failure of a secured party to take dominion would be incon-
sistent with the creation of a security interest by definition be-
cause a security interest is a property interest and dominion is a
necessary element of property. The Court may have intuitively
required dominion not merely to prevent fraud in the sense of
230. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363 (1925) (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 364.
232. Id.
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misplaced reliance, the concern of traditional perfection policy,
but also to change the subjective contractual relationship be-
tween a debtor and secured party into an objective legal interest
that would fall within the definition of property, the concern of
my neo-Hegelian perfection analysis. That is, like Llewellyn,
they were concerned with distinguishing a conveyance of proper-
ty from the contract to convey the property.
The drafters of the UCC claim to have rejected the rule of
Benedict v. RatnerY3 In my reinterpretation, this characteriza-
tion is an overstatement. The drafters contradicted Benedict v.
Ratner, in the sense that the Supreme Court voided non-notifica-
tion assignment of accounts that are not sufficiently policed by
the assignee. The UCC expressly provides that such assignments
are valid and enforceable as Article 9 security interests. 4 The
UCC does not, however, reject the underlying concept that, to be
an enforceable present property interest in accounts rather than
a mere contract right to future assignment of accounts, the as-
signment must be possessory in the Hegelian sense (i.e.,
objectified). The UCC drafters merely created a new form of
objectification-public filing. Article 9 provides that most assign-
ments of accounts fall within the defined term "security interest"
whether the assignment is an outright sale or only an assign-
ment as security. 5 Security interests are not enforceable
against most third parties (i.e., are not legally recognizable as
full property interests) unless they are perfected. 6 The for-
mality 7 required for perfection of assignments of accounts is
public filing.' In other words, in order for there to be an en-
233. The Official Comment to § 9-205 states:
Mhis section provides that a security interest is not invalid or fraudu-
lent by reason of liberty in the debtor to dispose of the collateral without
being required to account for the proceeds or substitute new collateral. It
repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner . . . and other cases which held
such arrangements void as a matter of law because the debtor was given
unfettered dominion or control over the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-205 cmt. 1 (1977).
234. Id. § 9-102(2).
235. Id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102.
236. Id. § 9-301.
237. Such formality is required in addition to satisfaction of all of the elements of
attachment. Id. §§ 9-203, 9-302.
238. Id. § 9-302. There is a de minimis exception that allows automatic perfection.
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forceable property right created in accounts, the identification of
the account to the assignee must be intersubjectively recogniz-
able (i.e., possessory).
Most interestingly, the concept of control proposed in the 1994
revisions of Articles 8 and 9 bears a strong family resemblance
to the Benedict rule's requirement of dominion. In Benedict, the
problem was that the secured party/assignee allowed the debt-
or/assignor to retain absolute dominion over the collateral. Do-
minion over intangibles (in this case, accounts) was defined as
the power to sell the collateral and to deal with the
proceeds. 9 Under revised Articles 8 and 9, a secured party ob-
tains control over collateral by means of a number of statutorily
prescribed methods by which the secured party obtains the pow-
er to sell the collateral without further cooperation from the
debtor. 4 That is, control can be seen as both dominion by the
secured party and at least partial restraint on dominion by the
debtor.
That is not to say that Benedict's dominion is identical to re-
vised Articles 8 and 9's control. Rather, I am suggesting that the
Court in Benedict may have implicitly and intuitively anticipat-
ed the revised UCC approach, albeit in a confused and imperfect
way. The Benedict opinion, as we have seen, spoke in terms of
fraud, whereas revised Articles 8 and 9 not only give substantive
rules of law; they affirmatively reject investigations into the
mental state of buyers in the indirect holding system.24' More-
239. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
241. One of the most striking changes in the revisions is the rejection of the tra-
ditional bona fide purchaser rule for securities held indirectly through brokers. Un-
der the old Article 8, a buyer of securities took subject to the claims of prior owners
unless the buyer could establish that she was a bona fide purchaser for value. The
bona fide standard required a showing of lack of notice and good faith. U.C.C. § 8-
302 (1977). This is the familiar pattern of all other Articles of the UCC, whereby
the derivation rule applies unless an negotiability exception can be established.
Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 351-56.
In contradistinction, under revised Article 8, a buyer of securities in the indirect
holding system will take free and clear of the interests of any prior claimant who
held the securities indirectly through a broker unless the prior claimant can show,
among other things, that the buyer actually colluded with the broker-dealer in vio-
lating the claimant's rights. U.C.C. § 8-502 (1994). In other words, there is no pre-
tense that buyers rely on or are defrauded by the acts of the prior claimants who
530 [Vol. 37:455
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over, Benedict is more absolutist than the revisions. On the one
hand, some of the language in the Benedict decision can be read
to suggest that the law would void any arrangement in which
dominion was left with the debtor. 2 Indeed, it contains dicta
that it would do so even if the assignee had objectified his prop-
erty interest through recordation.243 On the other hand, other
language suggests that it might be permissible to allow the
debtor to retain some dominion (the right to sell collateral) if
sufficient dominion (the right to control and account for proceeds
and to maintain a constant amount of collateral) is given to the
secured party.244 Consequently, Benedict v. Ratner did not de-
stroy non-notification financing but just resulted in strict polic-
ing requirements (decreasing the degree of dominion or control
of the debtor and increasing the dominion or control of the se-
cured party) that resulted in the professionalization of the lend-
ing industry.2
5
Under the proposed revisions, both the debtor and the secured
gave custody of their securities to brokers-buyers take free not because they were
fooled when they acted in good faith but because that is the rule of the market.
Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?, supra note 4, at 351-56.
A weakened bona fide purchaser rule will continue to apply to securities held
directly by investors, although it will be watered down to a "protected purchaser"
standard that eliminates the good faith requirement of existing law. U.C.C. § 8-303
(1994).
242. For example, the rule "rests not upon seeming ownership because of posses-
sion retained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion reserved." Benedict
v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363 (1925).
243. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
244. As the Court stated:
There must also be the same distinction as to degrees of dominion. Thus,
although an agreement that the assignor of accounts shall collect them
and pay the proceeds to the assignee will not invalidate the assignment
which it accompanies, the assignment must be deemed fraudulent in law
if it is agreed that the assignor may use the proceeds as he sees fit.
Benedict, 268 U.S. at 364 (footnote omitted).
245. In other words, the required policing techniques may have been impracticable
for amateur lenders-such as the father-assignee in Benedict. A specialized section of
the lending industry, however, was able to set up enforceable non-notification financ-
ing facilities. As is well-known, Grant Gilmore (one of the primary drafters'of origi-
nal Article 9) later in life had second thoughts about the UCC's rejection of the
Benedict rule because it made it too easy for secured parties to tie up all of a
debtor's assets. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 621-27
(1981).
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party can have control over the same assets if, for example, the
securities intermediary holding the assets agrees to obey sell
instructions from either the debtor or the secured party.246
Moreover, the proposed revisions recognize that objectification is
a relative concept. Even if we decide dominion in the secured
party is a more adequate mode of objectifying a security interest,
it is not the only way. We can, therefore, allow for other forms of
objectification-such as through filing or, in the case of auto-
matic perfection, notoriety of industry practices. In this view,
the question of relative adequacy is relevant not to enforceability
against all third parties generally (i.e., perfection) but as to
enforceability among a specific class of rival secured parties (i.e.,
priority).
To put this another way, the three Hegelian elements of prop-
erty are distinct as a theoretical matter, but not mutually exclu-
sive as an empirical one. This is particularly evident in the case
of intangible rights to payment. Possession (in the sense of an
objectively recognizable claim to ownership and exclusion)
threatens to merge with enjoyment (in the sense of the right of
collection), and enjoyment (in the sense of realization of value
through collection) threatens to merge with alienation (in the
sense of realization of value through sale to another).247 The
Court in Benedict v. Ratner, in effect, made possession
(objectification) of accounts equivalent to alienation (the right to
sell) and enjoyment (the right to deal with the proceeds). It is a
truism that the most complete objectification of property would
include complete and exclusive rights of possession, enjoyment,
and alienation because this is the definition of the most com-
plete form of property--ownership. Insofar as our legal system
recognizes lesser property interests, such as security interests,
however, it must also recognize lesser ways of objectifying pos-
session.
In other words, even as the UCC rejected the specific holding
of Benedict v. Ratner, Article 9 also arguably adopted its incho-
246. U.C.C. § 8-106 (1994).
247. Theoretically, collection and sale of an account should be economically equiva-
lent because the purchase price is based on the discounted present value of the
expected payments under the account.
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ate general principle-security interests should not be enforce-
able against third parties (i.e., be recognized as property) unless
they are made objectively recognizable by third parties, and the
1994 revisions adopt a variation of dominion as the most ade-
quate mode of objectifying the relationship by giving the secured
party the power to deal in the collateral.
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of ostensible ownership cannot be used to justify
the continuation of a perfection regime. It is based not on obser-
vations of actual commercial practice but on unverified and
unrealistic presumptions as to creditor behavior and empty
accusations of actual or constructive fraud. Most significantly, it
incorporates implicitly the physical metaphor that visualizes the
archetypical form of property as the sensuous grasp of a tangi-
ble. This hopelessly conflates a human, legal, and Symbolic
relationship of legal subjects with respect to the possession,
enjoyment, and alienation of external objects with the animalis-
tic, prelegal, and Real fact of a subject's physical contact with an
object. Whether this metaphor served as a crude, but useful, tool
for analyzing property relationships in a premodern agrarian
economy, or even a modern commercial economy in which, argu-
ably, most valuable forms of personal property in fact consisted
of tangibles, it is wholly inept for a postmodern information
economy. The use of the physical metaphor as a basis for the
law of intangibles has already proven to be unworkable in the
case of investment securities.
In order to analyze modern property relations, we need to
consider the functions and logic of property and reexamine the
presumptions underlying traditional ostensible ownership doc-
trine. If we do so, we will see that neither sensuous grasp nor
physical custody are, as previously thought, the normal or ar-
chetypical manifestations of property against which all other
property interests must be compared. Rather, physical custody
should be seen as only one concrete example, and not even the
most adequate example, of the abstract, yet essential, element of
an enforceable property interest traditionally known as "posses-
sion." Under a Hegelian property analysis, abstract possession is
the objectification of a property claim, in the sense of making it
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discoverable by the persons against whom it is to be enforced.
The specific concrete ways in which abstract possession as
objectification will be manifested cannot be derived by formal
logic, but can be determined pragmatically through actual cus-
tom and positive law. Under this analysis, the provisions of the
existing Article 9 of the UCC allowing for perfection by filing,
and the provisions of revised Articles 8 and 9 permitting auto-
matic perfection and perfection through control should be seen
not as substitutes for the norm of possession through physical
custody but as examples of possession as objectification. Only by
analyzing perfection in terms of possession by objectification can
we hope to escape the grasp of the physical metaphor and start
to imagine new imagery appropriate to noncustodial property
relations and property in intangibles.
